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CONTEXT AT THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 
Hassan Ahmad* 
ABSTRACT 
In this article, I propose a contextual approach to ICC 
jurisdiction normatively to be adopted by the Court’s Office of 
the Prosecutor and Pre-Trial Chamber in investigating and 
eventually prosecuting crimes under the Rome Statute. Under 
this contextual approach, I contend that both the Prosecutor and 
Pre-Trial Chamber are able to consider evidence outside the 
traditional notions of territorial and temporal jurisdiction to 
conceptualize a conflict in its entirety. The totality of cross-
border and inter-temporal evidence should be considered when 
deciding whether to investigate attacks that the Prosecutor has 
a reasonable basis to believe fall within the Court’s jurisdiction. 
Procedurally, the multi-step jurisdictional framework, the 
“Funnel Approach,”—beginning with the preliminary 
examination of a situation and proceeding to issuing an arrest 
warrant—provides flexibility to admit extra-jurisdictional 
evidence. Textually, the open-ended ‘gravity’ threshold does not 
limit the Prosecutor in considering evidence within the Rome 
Statute’s territorial or temporal limitations.   
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I. Introduction 
 
In his seminal work The Changing Structure of 
International Law, Wolfgang Friedmann argued that “it is . . . 
possible to work for the strengthening of international law and 
authority from the standpoint of ‘enlightened national interest,’ 
as being the best or even the only way of ensuring national 
survival.”1 State actors within the Westphalian system bound by 
territorial integrity have, over the 70 years since the end of 
World War II, made various efforts to strengthen the 
international legal regime.2 One of those methods in recent 
decades has been the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or 
“Court”).  
The ICC has been in existence for about two decades and, 
given this timespan, a body of jurisprudence has accumulated. 
From the Court’s decisions, patterns can be discerned with 
regard to the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction. The ICC is a Court 
of last resort. Admissibility of a case, therefore, depends on 
whether a national legal system is unable or unwilling to 
prosecute, and whether the case is of sufficient gravity.3  
The Rome Statute (“Statute”) and its supplementary 
documents govern the Court.4 Given its complementary 
                                               
1  WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 48 (1964); see also William Burke-White, Complementarity in Practice: 
The International Criminal Court as Part of a System of Multi-Level Global 
Governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 557 
(2005) (explaining that the relationship between the International Criminal 
Court and the Democratic Republic of Congo exhibited an inter-connected 
multi-leveled governance structure whereby the Court altered the DRC’s 
domestic politics and strengthened its judiciary). 
2  See LESLIE JOHNS, STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COURTS: THE HIDDEN 
COSTS OF LEGALIZATION (2015) (arguing that a court’s legitimacy and stability 
increase with heightened delegation (authority of a third party to adjudicate 
disputes) and obligation (normative instrumental pressure to abide by a 
ruling)). 
3  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17, July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. Admissibility of a case is distinct 
from the concept of jurisdiction (nationality, subject matter, territorial and 
temporal), as discussed in Part II. 
4  See, e.g., International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, ICC-PIDS-
LT-03-002/11_Eng. (Sept. 3-10, 2002), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ 
336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B-5BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf 
[hereinafter Elements of Crimes]; International Criminal Court, Regulations 
3
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function, the Court’s subject matter is limited to the “most 
serious crimes of international concern,”5 including crimes 
against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and crimes of 
aggression.6 
The Court consists of an independent Prosecutor couched 
with discretionary powers as to what situations to investigate.7 
An investigation into situations is proper where there is a 
reasonable basis to believe8 a crime within the Court’s 
jurisdiction has occurred. Then, an investigation can be 
commenced through a referral made by a State Party,9 a referral 
made by the United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”),10 or at 
the Prosecutor’s own initiative called proprio motu.11 A non-
State Party can also confirm jurisdiction through an Article 
12(3) Declaration with the caveat that it too, will then be subject 
to the Court’s jurisdiction, making its nationals prospectively 
subject to prosecution.12 
The Statute delineates a multi-step process beginning 
with preliminary examinations commenced with either of the 
referral mechanisms mentioned above, or by the Prosecutor’s 
proprio motu decision,13 formal investigations that require 
                                               
of the Court, ICC-BD/01-01-04 (May 26, 2004), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/B920AD62-DF49-4010-8907-E0D8CC61EBA4/277527/ 
Regulations_of_the_Court_170604EN.pdf [hereinafter Regulations of the 
Court]. 
5  Rome Statute, supra note 3, pmbl. 
6  The Assembly of State Parties agreed upon the coming into force of the 
Rome Statute that crimes of aggression would be defined in 2010 at the 
Kampala Conference. Article 15 bis now includes definitions of acts of 
aggression, and crimes of aggression will come within the Court’s jurisdiction 
after 2017. See generally, Harold Koh & Todd Buchwald, The Crime of 
Aggression: The United States Perspective, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 257 (2015). 
7  Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 15, 53. 
8  Id. art. 53(1). For a further discussion on the difference between a 
‘situation’ and a ‘case,’ see generally, William A. Schabas, Selecting Cases and 
Charging Crimes, in THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT (Carsten Stahn ed., 2015). 
9  Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 13(a). 
10  Id. art. 13(b). 
11  Id. art. 15(1). 
12 Id. art. 12(3). For an overview of the scope of Article 12(3) Declarations, 
see WILLIAM SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT  69-72 (2012). 
13  See Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, Office of The 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/3
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authorization by the Pre-Trial Chamber for proprio motu 
decisions,14 and the issuance of an arrest warrant when there 
are reasonable grounds to believe a crime within the Court’s 
jurisdiction has occurred.15 With each subsequent step, the 
standard of proof increases. This multi-step process—
irrespective of which method commences a preliminary 
examination—is governed by traditional notions of jurisdictional 
limitations that are akin to domestic courts.  
The Court’s jurisdictional scope is confined temporally, 
territorially, by subject matter, and by the person(s) the Court 
can prosecute.16 While the ICC mimics aspects of domestic courts 
in its jurisdictional limitations, it is a wholly unique court from 
those hearing criminal domestic matters and even its 
predecessor ad hoc tribunals, such as the International Military 
Tribunal in Nuremberg and the Far East, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and 
Rwanda (“ICTR”). It is also distinct from the hybrid tribunals, 
namely the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) and 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”).17 
Each of the ad hoc and hybrid tribunals dealt with a single 
conflict and did not include the Statute’s multiple referral 
mechanisms. Similarly, none of those tribunals provided the 
Prosecutor with discretionary powers as to which situations to 
investigate. As such, the possibility of politicization concerning 
prosecutorial selection within those tribunals remained low. 
Conversely, for the ICC, the Prosecutor or the UNSC has the 
ability to choose to investigate or refer, respectively, some 
                                               
Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. CT., ¶ 25 (Nov. 2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/ 
otp/OTP-Policy_Paper_Preliminary_Examinations_2013-ENG.pdf 
[hereinafter Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations]. 
14  Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 15(3). 
15  Id. art. 58. 
16  For a basic background on the ICC’s jurisdiction, see Philippe Kirsch, 
The Role of the International Criminal Court in Enforcing International 
Criminal Law, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 539, 542-44 (2007). 
17  Id. at 542 (“At the end of 2000, the deadline for signature of the Rome 
Statute, 139 States had signed the Statute, which was about twenty more than 
those that had voted for the Statute in 1998. To my knowledge, this is a unique 
case in the history of a treaty negotiation. Normally what happens is that you 
vote for an instrument at the time of the conference because it is easier and 
then forget about it because that is also easier.”). 
5
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situations over others. This selectivity is amenable to criticism 
based on subjective preferences or, in the case of the UNSC, 
national interest.  
Distinct from domestic courts, the scale of atrocities, both 
in terms of numbers of casualties or level of destruction, is 
generally higher at the ICC. Also, the Court typically aims to 
prosecute high level political, military, or rebel leaders who may 
be immune, whether legally or de facto, from prosecution in 
domestic courts. Moreover, the subject matter within the ICC’s 
jurisdiction is more political in nature. Few would oppose the 
contention that there are little geopolitical ramifications of 
prosecuting individual incidents of theft, rape, or even murder 
at the domestic level. However, when these crimes are 
committed on a large scale by criminal enterprises that are 
formed either from the State (as in Kenya, Sudan, or Libya) or 
from organized rebel groups opposing the State (as in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo or Cote D’Ivoire) and 
implicate intra and/or international relations, a political 
element arises. In this regard, the Court’s decisions delve into a 
State’s affairs and power structures and, at times, bring to light 
histories of oppression and injustice.18  
The purpose of this paper is to argue that while the four 
jurisdictional limitations mentioned above remain necessary to 
delineate the boundaries of cases that can proceed through 
preliminary examinations and investigations, it is possible to 
expand these limitations by considering the historical and 
political context of a particular conflict. By expanding 
                                               
18  See also John R. Bolton, Under Sec’y for Arms Control and Int’l Sec., 
Remarks to the Federalist Society: The United States and the International 
Criminal Court (Nov. 14, 2002), https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/us/rm/15158 
.htm (“The Court’s flaws are basically two-fold, substantive, and structural. As 
to the former, the ICC’s authority is vague and excessively elastic, and the 
Court’s discretion ranges far beyond normal or acceptable judicial 
responsibilities, giving it broad and unacceptable powers of interpretation that 
are essentially political and legislative in nature. This is most emphatically not 
a Court of limited jurisdiction. Crimes can be added subsequently that go 
beyond those included in the Rome Statute. Parties to the Statute are subject 
to these subsequently-added crimes only if they affirmatively accept them, but 
the Statute purports automatically to bind non-parties, such as the United 
States, to any such new crimes. It is neither reasonable nor fair that these 
crimes would apply to a greater extent to states that have not agreed to the 
terms of the Rome Statute than to those that have.”). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/3
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jurisdictional limitations to aggregate information at the 
preliminary examination and investigation phases, the Court 
could achieve the gravity threshold in cases where it would not 
have done so previously. This article elaborates upon this 
expansive approach in more detail in Parts II and III.  
The terminology of ‘expanding’ jurisdiction, instead of 
‘changing’ jurisdiction, is used because, as will be outlined in 
detail below, in order for the herein argument to apply, the Court 
will require at least one of the bases of its jurisdiction to be met 
before jurisdiction can be expanded. In this regard, this article 
does not argue that the Court should change its jurisdiction as 
established in the Statute. It does not argue that the Court 
should amend the Statute in any way. It only argues that in the 
midst of a single conflict, where information exists from attacks 
taking place outside the Court’s traditional jurisdiction, the 
Court should be able to consider that information. By 
considering information in the aggregate—whether from inside 
or outside the Court’s traditional jurisdiction—situations and 
cases could come before the Court that would otherwise be 
excluded. This, in turn, will fill the impunity gap—a concept 
elaborated upon throughout this paper.   
Can the Court use contextual factors outside its strict 
notions of jurisdiction to prosecute ISIS? According to the 
Prosecutor’s April 8, 2015 Statement, the answer is no. The 
Prosecutor conceded that the Court does not have territorial 
jurisdiction because Iraq and Syria—where the majority of 
attacks have taken place—are not State Parties. The Prosecutor 
also emphasized that while there would be jurisdiction over 
State Party nationals who have traveled to Syria and Iraq to 
fight with ISIS, the terror group is “primarily led by nationals of 
Iraq and Syria.”19 Therefore, in addition to not having territorial 
jurisdiction, the Court also lacked nationality jurisdiction.  
                                               
19  Press Release, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on the alleged crimes committed by ISIS, 
INT’L CRIM. CT. (Apr. 8, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name 
=otp-stat-08-04-2015-1 (“The information gathered indicates that several 
thousand foreign fighters have joined the ranks of ISIS in the past months 
alone, including significant numbers of State Party nationals from, inter alia, 
Tunisia, Jordan, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Australia.”) [ISIS Statement]. 
7
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The argument this article wishes to assert is that 
aggregating information from attacks in both State and non-
State Party territories to reach the requisite gravity threshold 
would allow the Prosecutor to pursue ISIS leadership, even 
though they are non-State Party nationals. ISIS attacks within 
the same conflict have occurred on both State Party (France20 
and Brussels21) and non-State Party (Syria, Iraq, and Turkey) 
territories. Evidence from all these attacks should be aggregated 
to meet the gravity threshold and bring ISIS leadership under 
the Court’s jurisdiction. This article advocates that the Court 
need only to expand its notions of temporal and territorial 
jurisdiction to close the impunity gap consisting of matters that 
i) are neither prosecuted by State Parties nor the Court or, 
otherwise, ii) are not prosecuted by non-State Parties where the 
Court cannot exert its complementary jurisdiction. This 
approach has been practiced, although inconsistently, by the ad 
hoc tribunals and, in select situations, before the ICC. The ISIS 
example is delved into later in the paper.  
A broader and more expansive approach to temporal and 
territorial jurisdiction that casts a wide net when relevant 
probative evidence is considered is necessary given the 
increasingly cross-border nature of contemporary conflicts. 
These conflicts, at times, may not fit within the strict 
jurisdictional boundaries envisioned by the Statute. State Party 
territories border non-State Party territories even though 
attacks within the same ongoing conflict permeate borders 
separating these territories. A broader jurisdictional approach 
that is not limited to traditional notions of territoriality and 
temporality will lead to more situations that fall within the 
Court’s ambit, thereby narrowing the impunity gap.  
Throughout this paper, I will limit my argument in favour of 
jurisdictional expansion to the preliminary examination, 
                                               
20  Anne Barnard & Hwaida Saad, ISIS Claims Responsibility for Blasts 
that Killed Dozens in Beirut, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes 
.com/2015/11/13/world/middleeast/lebanon-explosions-southern-beirut-
hezbollah.html. 
21  Alissa J. Rubin, Aurelien Breeden & Anita Raghavan, Strikes Claimed 
by ISIS Shut Brussels and Shake European Security, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/23/world/europe/brussels-airport-
explosions.html?_r=0. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/3
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investigation, and authorization stages, because these stages 
comprise the framework for analyzing when and how a situation 
comes within the Court’s jurisdiction. 
Analyzing the potential use of context in determining the 
Court’s jurisdiction has become pertinent following a referral 
made by the Union of Comoros (“Comoros”) pursuant to an 
attack in May 2010 aboard the MV Mari Marmara, a vessel 
registered to Comoros and delivering humanitarian aid to the 
Gaza Strip.22 After the Prosecutor deemed the matter to be of 
insufficient gravity to warrant formal investigation by the 
Court,23 Comoros brought an application to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to request the Prosecutor to reconsider her decision.24 
While the Pre-Trial Chamber granted the request and asked the 
Prosecutor to reconsider her decision not to investigate on the 
ground that the decision to investigate occupies the lowest 
evidentiary threshold of a “reasonable basis to proceed,”25 one of 
Comoros’s arguments not considered in the Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
decision was that the underlying political context of the Israeli-
                                               
22  The facts leading to the referral in the situation in Comoros are fairly 
straight-forward and not necessarily contested. The vessel was surrounded by 
Israeli Defence Forces’ (“IDF”) helicopters with IDF soldiers firing bullets upon 
the ship. IDF soldiers also landed on the ship. The incident resulted in 10 
deaths and numerous others injured. See Situation on the Registered Vessels 
of the Union of the Comoros, The Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of 
Cambodia, Case No. ICC-01/13-34, Decision on the request of the Union of the 
Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation, at 
3 (July 16, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR 2015_13139.PDF. 
23  Situation on Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia 
Article 53(1) Report, Office of the Prosecutor, ¶ 151 (Int’l Crim. Ct. Nov. 6, 
2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/otp-com-article_53(1)-report-06nov 
2014eng.pdf. 
24  Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 53(3); see Situation on Registered 
Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, The Hellenic Republic of Greece and the 
Kingdom of Cambodia, Case No. ICC-01/13-3-Red, Application for Review 
Pursuant to Article 53(3)(a) of the Prosecutor’s Decision of 6 November 2014 
not to initiate an investigation in the Situation, ¶ 1 (Jan. 29, 2015), https:// 
www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_00576.PDF [Comoros Application]. 
25  In the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
stated that the ‘reasonable basis to believe’ test stated in Article 53(1)(a) is the 
lowest evidentiary standard found in the Statute. See Situation in the Republic 
of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09-19, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome 
Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya, ¶ 27 (Mar. 31, 2010), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Court 
Records/CR2010_02399.PDF. 
9
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Palestinian conflict and the existing blockade on the Gaza Strip 
made any and all subsequent acts that could reasonably be 
crimes, inter alia, within the Court’s jurisdiction. Comoros’s 
lawyers argued in their brief: 
 
“[T]he wider occupation/conflict and the blockade are pre-
conditions to the exercise of the Court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction and the necessary contextual requirements for the 
conduct on board the vessels (over which the Court has 
territorial and temporal jurisdiction) to be charged as war 
crimes at the ICC. . . . Acts occurring outside of the territorial 
and temporal jurisdiction of the Court can certainly be taken 
into account when considering whether the Court can exercise 
jurisdiction over conduct which is within its territorial and 
temporal jurisdiction and in order better to understand and to 
characterise such conduct.”26  
 
Comoros’s argument was that the Court should consider the 
wider context of the blockade and occupation over the 
Palestinian territories as part of its gravity analysis. In other 
words, Comoros was requesting the Court to consider 
information outside its strict notion of territorial jurisdiction, as 
Palestine was not a State Party at the time. Such consideration 
would militate in favour of concluding that a reasonable basis to 
believe that crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction have 
occurred. As this article will argue, the Office of the Prosecutor 
(“OTP”), and the Pre-Trial Chamber when authorization is 
required, can and should aggregate evidence from inside and 
outside their strict notions of territorial and temporal 
jurisdiction when such evidence regards the same conflict. This 
aggregate approach should be taken when an alternatively 
truncated approach considering only evidence within the Court’s 
territorial and temporal jurisdiction would not fulfill the 
requisite gravity threshold. A more detailed account of the 
Situation in Comoros27 is provided later in the paper. 
                                               
26  Comoros Application, supra note 24, at 8. 
27  The Prosecutor appealed the Pre-Trial Chambers decision requesting 
her to reconsider the decision to not investigate. The Appeals Chamber 
dismissed the appeal in limine on the grounds that decisions of admissibility 
are not appealable under Article 82(1). See Situation on Registered Vessels of 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/3
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This paper proceeds in six subsequent parts. Part II 
outlines the jurisdictional regime as it currently stands within 
the Statute. While the article outlines all bases for jurisdiction, 
I specify that my argument for a full contextual analysis will be 
confined to territorial and temporal jurisdiction. That part ends 
with a salient discussion on the distinction between jurisdiction 
and admissibility and, perhaps more importantly, on the 
limitations of the herein contextual approach. I specifically 
outline that a matter will have to fall under, at least, one of the 
four traditional notions of the Court’s jurisdiction for a 
contextual approach to apply. Any argument for expanding 
jurisdiction that does not exist in the first place is moot. 
Part III presents my idea of Context. While the herein 
approach to expanding jurisdiction may be conceptualized as 
considering “political” context, taking into account the history of 
inter and intra-national relations, external hegemonic forces, 
colonialist history, and ethnic and religious divides, among 
others, I steer clear of the term “political” given the complex and 
nuanced philosophical underpinnings that render that term’s 
numerous subjective connotations.28 The section then proceeds 
through decisions by both the ad hoc and hybrid tribunals and 
the ICC in which contextual factors were considered as an 
evidentiary matter when determining whether to issue an arrest 
warrant or convict the accused.  
While my advocacy for a contextual approach focuses on 
the ICC’s initial assertion of jurisdiction by the OTP and the Pre-
Trial Chamber, previous decisions—at albeit different stages of 
the litigation process—illustrate that the tribunals and Court 
are able to account for evidence outside the traditional 
boundaries of temporal and territorial jurisdiction. Part IV 
                                               
the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of 
Cambodia, ICC-01/13-51, Decision on the admissibility of the Prosecutor’s 
appeal against the “Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to 
review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation” (Nov. 6, 2015), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_20965.PDF. 
28  This contention concerning the difficulty in defining the term “political” 
is also expressed in Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive 
Selection at the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 266-67 
(2012) (“Most recently, some authors have suggested that the prosecutor’s role 
is inevitably political and should be acknowledged as such. The participants in 
this debate rarely define what they mean by ‘political. . .’”). 
11
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builds on the decisions cited in Part III by conceptualizing a 
contextual approach as an evidentiary enquiry in which the 
focus should be on the relevance and probity of collected 
information falling outside traditional territorial and temporal 
parameters.  
Part V delves into the justifications for Context 
consideration. I divide that part into procedural and textual 
justifications. Procedurally, I argue that the ICC’s multi-step 
prosecutorial process, which I term the Funnel Approach, 
provides a relatively open-ended evidentiary scope to the OTP 
and Pre-Trial Chamber to consider Context. Textually, I argue 
that the gravity analysis is intentionally ambiguous so as to 
provide a flexible and fluid approach to asserting jurisdiction. 
Part VI proceeds through various implications of Context 
consideration. I argue that Context must be taken into account 
to effectively close the impunity gap between i) State Parties 
unwilling or unable to prosecute a situation; and ii) non-State 
Parties that do not fall within the Court’s jurisdiction. I also 
address criticisms that may arise to a contextual approach to 
jurisdiction, such as impinging State sovereignty, turning the 
Court’s members into a group of activists rather than objective 
and sober legal determinists, and the prospect of adding 
unwanted ambiguity into the jurisdictional analysis. Part VI 
goes through a practical example of prosecuting ISIS at the ICC. 
Part VII concludes this paper.  
II. ICC Jurisdiction 
 
a. Traditional Notions of Jurisdiction  
 
The Rome Statute outlines the four bases of temporal, 
nationality, territorial, and subject matter jurisdiction in 
various provisions.29 Temporally, the Court’s jurisdiction applies 
                                               
29  See Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 11-13, 22. Nationality jurisdiction 
differs from personal jurisdiction in the domestic context. Whereas Article 
12(2)(b) of the Rome Statute confers jurisdiction over “[t]he State of which the 
person accused of the crime is a national,” personal jurisdiction in the domestic 
context is a person or organization’s physical presence within a State’s 
territory or, otherwise, its ‘minimum contacts’ with that State. See Int’l Shoe 
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/3
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only after the Statute enters into force, which is July 1, 2002.30 
For parties signing after that date, the Statute enters into force 
from the date the State Party signed it.31 Furthermore, there is 
no criminal responsibility “unless the conduct in question 
constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court.”32 This applies particularly to crimes of 
aggression, which are not within the Court’s jurisdiction until at 
least 2017.33 Therefore, acts constituting the elements of a crime 
of aggression committed before 2017 cannot be investigated and 
prosecuted by the Court unless those same acts are initiated 
again or, otherwise, continue after 2017. The bar to retroactivity 
under the Statute (other than Article 12(3) Declarations) differs 
from the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) 
conception, which allows for prosecution of crimes retroactively 
when those crimes are both accessible and reasonably 
foreseeable by an offender.34 
Under nationality jurisdiction, the Court is limited to 
prosecuting nationals of a State Party. For Article 12(3) 
Declarations or UNSC referrals where the Court’s jurisdiction 
extends to non-State Party territories, the Court has jurisdiction 
over nationals from those territories. The ICC does not recognize 
immunity ratione personae for crimes committed by sitting or 
former heads of state.35 While the Court can assert jurisdiction 
over nationals committing crimes on non-State Party territories, 
                                               
30  Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 11(1). 
31  Id. art. 11(2). Under Article 11(2), there is an exception for declarations 
made under Article 12(3) for non-State Parties. For Article 12(3) declarations, 
the Statute applies retroactively. Article 11(2) states, “[i]f a State becomes a 
Party to this Statute after its entry into force, the Court may exercise its 
jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of 
this Statute for that State, unless that State has made a declaration under 
article 12, paragraph 3.” (emphasis added). 
32  Id. art. 22(1). 
33  See Koh & Buchwald, supra note 6, at 257. 
34  See Schabas, supra note 12, at 74 (citing SW v. United Kingdom, 355-
B Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 35-36 (1996); CR v. United Kingdom, 335-B Eur. Ct. 
H.R. paras. 33-34 (1995); Kononov v. Latvia, App. No. 36376/04 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2010). 
35  Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International 
Criminal Court, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 407 (2004) (“[I]mmunity ratione materiae 
does not exist with respect to domestic criminal proceedings for any of the 
international crimes set out in the Statute of the ICC.”). 
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the Prosecutor retains discretion whether to pursue those 
nationals if, in her opinion, they play subordinate or minor roles 
within a criminal organization. This appears to be the 
Prosecutor’s approach to State Party nationals committing 
crimes in Iraq and Syria as part of ISIS, as discussed above.  
The ICC has territorial jurisdiction over crimes 
committed on the territory of a State Party regardless of the 
offender’s nationality.36 The Court also has jurisdiction over 
crimes committed on the territory of States accepting 
jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis as well as through UNSC 
referrals.37 The exception to the general rule for territorial 
jurisdiction exists under Article 121(5), adopted in the 2010 
Conference, whereby State Parties that have not accepted that 
amendment are not subject to its jurisdiction. Under territorial 
jurisdiction, the Statute also includes crimes committed on 
board vessels or aircrafts registered to a State Party, which is 
why Comoros was able to refer a case to the Court as the MV 
Mavi Marmara is considered an extension of its territorial 
boundaries. 
For the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and crimes of aggression falling within the Court’s 
jurisdiction, each crime is outlined in the Statute,38 and 
supplemented by the accompanying Elements of Crimes.39 By 
and large, the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction is adopted from 
the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals after World War II where 
the crimes were referred to as crimes against peace, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity.40 Although the term ‘genocide’ 
had already been coined at the time of the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
trials, the indictments against Nazi perpetrators for the crimes 
against European Jews were argued under crimes against 
humanity.41 
                                               
36  Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 12(2)(a). 
37  Id. art. 13(b). 
38  Id. arts. 6-8. 
39  Elements of Crimes, supra note 4. 
40  See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War 
Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter 
Nuremberg Charter]. 
41  Schabas, supra note 12, at 90-91. 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/3
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As mentioned above, the argument for expanding 
jurisdictional scope will herein be limited to temporal and 
territorial jurisdiction. The Court’s subject matter jurisdiction is 
defined and limited to the four crimes mentioned in the Statute. 
Also, its limitations on nationality jurisdiction leave little space 
for ambiguity, as it is a question of fact whether someone is or is 
not a national of a particular country. Conversely, relevant and 
probative information can be considered from both inside and 
outside the Court’s temporal and territorial jurisdiction in the 
midst of the same conflict to determine which situations should 
be investigated.  
Particularly with territorial jurisdiction, there exists an 
asymmetry between where conflicts occur and where the Court 
can exercise its jurisdiction. In other words, modern conflicts 
inevitably permeate across State borders. Conflicts often times 
take place in areas where a State Party to the Court borders a 
non-State Party(ies).42 Consequentially, the Court is unable to 
consider the entirety of a situation due to its limitations to 
investigate only within the territory of a State Party. Take, for 
instance, conflicts occurring in the Middle East or parts of 
Africa. While Palestine is a State Party after its conferral as an 
observer State at the UN General Assembly,43 Israel is not a 
State Party; while Jordan is a State Party, Iraq and Syria are 
not State Parties; while Kenya is a State Party, Somalia is not; 
while Chad is a State Party, Libya and Egypt are not. The porous 
nature of intra and inter-State conflicts obviates the Statute’s 
ability to effectively and adequately investigate those situations 
that fall within its jurisdiction by trimming its investigative and 
prosecutorial scope only to those situations that fall strictly 
within its traditional notions of territorial and temporal 
jurisdiction.  
While a situation may fall within the Court’s jurisdiction 
pursuant to an attack occurring within the territory of a State 
                                               
42  A related example concerns transnational conflicts where combatants 
of a State Party commit crimes on the territory of a non-State Party, e.g. 
British forces committing alleged war crimes in Iraq. See HÉCTOR OLASOLO, 
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 33 (2012). 
43  State Parties to the Rome Statute: Asia-Pacific States, INT’L CRIM. CT., 
https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/asian%20states/ 
Pages/asian%20states.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2017). 
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Party, the Court will be forced to neglect, at times, a plethora of 
relevant information that may be necessary for it to meet the 
gravity threshold necessary to continue with the prosecutorial 
process. Gravity determinations initially inhibited an 
investigation from commencing for alleged war crimes in Iraq by 
British forces.44 Nonetheless, after reconsidering, the OTP has 
subsequently decided to investigate.45 
 
b. Jurisdiction vs. Admissibility 
 
As a final note to the jurisdictional framework as it 
currently stands in the Statute, both the concept and analysis of 
jurisdiction (under the four rubrics discussed above) are distinct 
from the admissibility of a case or situation. Whereas 
jurisdiction is a threshold determination, admissibility is 
considered after jurisdiction has been established and can 
negate the prospect of a situation reaching the Court even 
though it falls within the Court’s jurisdiction. Under Article 17, 
the admissibility analysis considers whether a case under the 
Court’s jurisdiction is or has been investigated or prosecuted in 
a national jurisdiction, whether prosecution would amount to res 
judicata, or, otherwise, whether the case is of sufficient 
‘gravity.’46 Similarly, under Article 53, the Prosecutor can decide 
not to initiate an investigation taking into account Article 17 
factors or by using lack of gravity to conclude that an 
investigation would not be in the interests of justice. In sum, 
admissibility can negate the finding of prima facie jurisdiction. 
                                               
44  Letters to Senders re Iraq, Office of the Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. CT., 2 
n.4 (Feb. 9, 2006), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/FD042F2E-678E-4E 
C6-8121-690BE61D0B5A/143682/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February 
_2007.pdf (“[T]aking into account all the [gravity] considerations, the situation 
did not appear to meet the required threshold of the Statute.”). 
45  Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court, Fatou Bensouda, re-opens the preliminary examination of the situation 
in Iraq (May 13, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-
statement-iraq-13-05-2014. 
46  See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17, 20(3). For an overview of the 
distinction between admissibility and jurisdiction, see Markus Benzing, The 
Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court: International 
Criminal Justice between State Sovereignty and the Fight against Impunity, 7 
UNYB 591, 594 (2003). 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/3
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Throughout this paper, it will be advocated that the OTP 
and Pre-Trial Chamber may consider relevant and probative 
information outside territorial and temporal jurisdictional 
boundaries to bolster the admissibility criterion of gravity. As 
stated, the Statute contains separate enquiries for jurisdiction 
and admissibility. Jurisdiction considers where, when, why, and 
to and by whom attacks were committed. It is a preliminary 
enquiry separate and apart from the admissibility requirements 
outlined in Article 17 for a particular case and in Article 53 for 
the initiation of an investigation into a situation. 
Admissibility—specifically, whether a State Party is prosecuting 
a matter or whether it reaches the gravity threshold—is only 
considered once one of the four bases for jurisdiction outlined 
above is fulfilled.  
As just stated, the herein argument only applies in 
situations where one of the four bases for jurisdiction has been 
fulfilled. If jurisdiction is not established, the Court cannot 
consider contextual factors. Only when either nationality, 
subject matter, territorial, or temporal jurisdiction exists can the 
Court expand that jurisdiction. This paper advocates for the 
permissibility of expanding territorial and/or temporal 
jurisdiction once one basis for jurisdiction is established.  
Currently, statutory limitations exist for both temporal 
and territorial jurisdiction, as outlined at the beginning of this 
section. Temporally, the Statute only applies after July 2002. 
Territorially, the Statute is limited to State Parties, or, 
otherwise, its nationals in non-State Party territories. I argue 
here that the Court can expand territorial and/or temporal 
jurisdiction at the preliminary examination and investigation 
stages to consider contextual information temporally from before 
July 2002, or territorially from attacks on non-State Party 
territories committed by non-State Party nationals. This 
information from outside the Court’s traditional jurisdiction can 
then be aggregated with information from attacks within the 
Court’s traditional temporal and territorial jurisdiction. That 
information can then be used in the aggregate to reach the 
gravity threshold required for admissibility under Articles 17 
and 53.  
Two caveats exist to the herein approach to expanding 
jurisdiction to meet the gravity threshold. First, the information 
17
HASSAN AHMAD - CONTEXT AT THE ICC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2017  2:25 PM 
2017] Context at the ICC 149 
considered from both inside and outside the Court’s traditional 
temporal and territorial jurisdiction must relate to the same 
conflict. The cross-border nature of conflicts has led to attacks 
being perpetrated in various states and at various times. Some 
of these attacks may fall within the Court’s traditional temporal 
or territorial jurisdiction, and others may not. Second, the 
contextual aggregate approach to information collection is only 
used when staying within the Court’s traditional temporal and 
territorial jurisdiction would not itself meet the gravity 
threshold. For instance, in the flotilla attack, gravity may not 
have been met when looking at the attack on its own even 
though it fell within the Court’s territorial jurisdiction. There is 
permission under the Statute, as Comoros argued, for the Court 
to consider information from within the Gaza Strip, which was 
not under the Court’s territorial jurisdiction at the time of the 
attack. Aggregating information from attacks on the flotilla 
(inside the Court’s territorial jurisdiction) with information from 
attacks on the Palestinian territories (outside the Court’s 
territorial jurisdiction) would assist in meeting the gravity 
threshold. It is arguable whether the gravity threshold would be 
met by considering the flotilla attack in isolation—given the 
relatively low number of casualties resulting from the attack. 
For this example, the expansive aggregate approach to 
information collection would serve as a basis to potentially 
prosecute Israeli officials who would not otherwise come within 
the Court’s jurisdiction, as Israel is not a State Party.  
To further elaborate, it is mandatory that one of the four 
traditional bases of jurisdiction is present before a contextual 
approach is employed. In this vein, I do not argue that a matter 
of high gravity (i.e. resulting in many casualties or 
infrastructural destruction) can come before the Court when the 
traditional requirements of the four bases of jurisdiction as laid 
out in the Statute have not been met. A heinous attack killing 
hundreds or thousands of people completely within the territory 
of a non-State Party in the midst of a conflict with no direct or 
indirect effects on the territory of a State Party and with no 
involvement from State Parties’ nationals would not fall within 
the Court’s jurisdiction. As such, a contextual approach could 
not be taken. In the next part of this paper, I outline five 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/3
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requirements for the application of a contextual approach to 
cross-border conflicts.   
As stated in the introduction, the herein argument is 
limited to expanding, not changing, the Court’s established 
bases for jurisdiction. Asserting jurisdiction regardless of the 
nationality and territory of the accused and attack, respectively, 
would amount to universal jurisdiction—a concept for which 
there is no basis in the Statute.47 Nonetheless, from the 
examples outlined in Part III, the notion of an exclusively 
domestic conflict is becoming less common. The increasing norm 
is cross-border conflicts where attacks within the same conflict 
are perpetrated in various places and over a prolonged period of 
time. As such, it is necessary to apply a contextual approach to 
expand the ICC’s jurisdiction to account for these trans-border 
conflicts and prosecute non-State Party nationals who are 
leading criminal organizations from non-State Party territories. 
To conclude this discussion on the distinction between 
jurisdiction and admissibility in light of the requirements and 
caveats presented above, I lay out five criteria that must be 
fulfilled to proceed with an investigation under an expansive 
contextual approach aggregating information from inside and 
outside the Court’s temporal and territorial jurisdiction. The five 
criteria are as follows: 
 
1. Attacks by the same organization, whether directly by its 
leadership or (more likely) through its subordinates, would 
occur on the territories of both State and non-State Party 
territories;  
2. The organization’s leadership would reside in the territory 
of a non-State Party and be nationals of a non-State Party;  
3. The attacks on State Party territories, taken in isolation, 
would not reach the gravity threshold; 
                                               
47  Kirsch, supra note 16, at 542 (“The ICC does not have universal 
jurisdiction.”); see also Maximo Langer, The Diplomacy of Universal 
Jurisdiction: The Political Branches And The Transnational Prosecution Of 
International Crimes, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2011) (“Unlike the regime of 
international criminal tribunals created by the United Nations Security 
Council and the enforcement regime of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
the regime of universal jurisdiction is completely decentralized.”). 
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4. Aggregating the casualties and/or effects of the attacks by 
the organization on State and non-State Party territories 
would fulfill the gravity threshold; and 
5. The State Party would be unable or unwilling to prosecute 
the perpetrators of attacks on its territory.  
 
Each of the above five criteria must be fulfilled 
independently for the OTP and Pre-Trial Chamber to consider 
information outside its temporal and territorial jurisdiction 
during the preliminary examination and investigation stages. If 
even one of the above factual enquiries is not fulfilled, then the 
herein argument does not apply. Part III below specifically 
defines Context and its significance. That part then proceeds 
through previous decisions by both the ad hoc tribunals and the 
ICC where evidence—albeit at times in later stages of the 
prosecutorial process—was considered outside the Court’s 
temporal or territorial jurisdiction.  
 
III. A Contextual Jurisdictional Framework  
a. Defining Context 
As alluded to above, the ICC is distinct from its domestic 
and ad hoc / hybrid predecessors in that its prosecutorial 
discretion function and ability to consider large scale crimes 
perpetrated either by a State’s government or forces opposing 
the government inherently politicize its proceedings. State 
actors, whether as perpetrators or recipients of armed attacks, 
have and will play heavily into cases before the ICC. As Burke-
White notes, the DRC’s self-referral to the Court functioned “as 
a politically expedient solution for the Congolese president to 
deal with potential electoral rivals. . .”48 The interaction between 
the Court and domestic political systems comes in various forms, 
either through the State referral system or, otherwise, the 
requirement to cooperate with the Court’s proceedings.49 
The Court is not only subject to a referral from a State 
Party, but also from the UNSC, a committee of permanent and 
                                               
48  Burke-White, supra note 1, at 559. 
49  See generally Rome Statute, supra note 3, at Part IX. 
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rotating States. Moreover, as a matter proceeds through its 
prosecutorial process, ICC judges are required to assess political 
concepts, such as diplomatic immunity, military command, the 
right to self-determination, and the responsibility to protect. 
While these topics may arise (although rarely) in domestic 
prosecutions, the ICC serves as an outside body whose 
jurisdiction only exists due to a State’s consent by treaty or, 
otherwise, as a result of a UNSC referral foisting jurisdiction 
upon a State. In that light, the ICC essentially imposes its 
jurisdiction over a State’s sovereignty and this may be done, at 
times, while conflicts in other States are not being investigated 
or prosecuted.50 This permanent function, as opposed to the ad 
hoc nature of the predecessor tribunals, renders the ICC a 
unique Court that must remain loyal to its mandate to prosecute 
crimes within its jurisdiction while simultaneously relying on 
individual States to fulfill their duties and responsibilities 
triggered upon signing the Statute.  
While the contention of this article is that the ICC should 
aggregate information both from inside and outside its 
traditional notions of territorial and temporal jurisdiction, I 
remain hesitant to characterize this expansive approach as 
considering “political” context. Politics as social order and 
societal classification finds its roots in Aristotelian thought, 
which essentialised political order from the family structure all 
the way up to a State’s relation to its subjects. The term “politics” 
itself has deep historical roots with varied interpretations and 
iterations as diverse as Mill’s harm theory, Machiavelli’s 
separation of morality and the science of politics, and Locke’s 
rights-based approach to politics leading to the Rawlsian 
conception of a liberal State. Given the historical complexity of 
the term “politics” vis-à-vis its narrative of State-to-State or 
State-to-citizen relations, I advocate for the ICC to expand its 
information gathering approach by stretching the boundaries of, 
specifically, territorial and temporal jurisdiction. I will simply 
                                               
50  See deGuzman, supra note 28, at 276 (“The ICC currently suffers from 
low purposive legitimacy—it lacks both a defined community to which it is 
responsible and accepted values or goals associated with its work. The ICC’s 
deficiencies in these regards distinguish it from national courts and explain 
why it is more important for the ICC to articulate acceptable justifications for 
its selection decisions than it is for national courts to do so.”). 
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refer to this concept going forward as Context. This can be 
illustrated through the following formula: 
 
Context (in relation to a particular conflict) 
= 
Relevant and probative information inside and outside the 
geographical boundaries of a State Party 
+ 
Relevant and probative information prior to and after the 
ratification of the Rome Statute 
 
The consideration of Context, whether by the OTP or Pre-
Trial Chamber (for authorizations of proprio motu decisions), 
when deciding whether to assert jurisdiction is significant for 
three reasons. First, the prevalence of cross-border armed 
conflicts in conjunction with the reality that not all States have 
ratified the Statute means that there will exist conflicts where, 
according to the strict parameters of the Statute, a portion of 
attacks will fall within the Statute’s territorial jurisdiction while 
other attacks will not—even though those attacks may be 
committed by the same entity in the midst of the same conflict. 
As Moir notes, the traditional dichotomy in the law of war 
between international (State versus State) and non-
international (State versus rebel group) armed conflicts is 
breaking down. Modern warfare often consists of State versus 
rebel conflicts that transcend national borders.51 This is 
exemplified by the U.S. war on terror against Al-Qaeda post-
9/11, and the current ongoing conflict between Western and 
Middle Eastern States against ISIS.   
The proliferation of non-State actors over the past fifty 
years has increased cross-border conflicts. Previous conflicts 
between State and non-State actors tended to stay within the 
boundaries of a single State. This is illustrated in the conflict 
between the Nicaraguan government and the Contras, or 
between the South Vietnamese Government and the National 
Liberation Front (Viet Cong). However, contemporary conflicts 
                                               
51  Lindsay Moir, ‘It’s a Bird! It’s a Plane! It’s a Non-International Armed 
Conflict!’: Cross-Border Hostilities Between States and Non-State Actors, in 
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO THE LAW OF WAR 71-94 (2014). 
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do not respect State boundaries as in the past. Conflicts now 
expand across regions, such as the Lord’s Resistance Army’s 
conflict with Uganda, South Sudan, the Central African 
Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Some 
conflicts even transcend continents, as exemplified by ISIS’s 
attacks in various parts of the Middle East, West Africa, and 
Western Europe. The increasing normalcy of cross-border 
conflicts across nations that are State or non-State Parties 
makes the requirement of considering Context necessary.   
The second significant reason for Context relates to the 
first - the emergence in many armed conflicts of non-State actors 
that do not adhere to the traditional laws of war.52 Organized 
rebel groups, such as ISIS and Boko Haram, are not only 
conflating traditional territorial borders, but also launching 
attacks in multiple countries across a prolonged timespan 
without a firm declaration of war. In conjunction with Al-
Shabab, another terrorist organization, Boko Haram, has 
launched offensives in parts of Kenya and Nigeria, both State 
Parties, while operating out of parts of Somalia, a non-State 
Party.53 Any potential prosecution of either Boko Haram or Al-
Shabab members can and should be considered in the territorial 
aggregate when the OTP engages in its analysis of whether to 
commence an investigation. Bifurcating Boko Haram and Al-
                                               
52  Non-state actors are bound by International Humanitarian Law as a 
matter of customary international law and by virtue of the citizenship of their 
members in States Parties to the relevant treaties. See Jelena Pejic, The 
Protective Scope of Common Article 3: More than Meets the Eye, 93 INT’L REV. 
RED CROSS 189, 202 (2011) (“There is no substantive reason why the norms 
that apply to an armed conflict between a state and an organized armed group 
within its territory should not also apply to an armed conflict with such a group 
that is not restricted to its territory. It therefore seems . . . that to the extent 
that treaty provisions relating to non-international armed conflicts incorporate 
standards of customary international law, these standards should apply to all 
armed conflicts between a state and non-state actors. This means that, at the 
very least, Common Article 3 will apply to such conflicts.”) (quoting David 
Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions 
or Legitimate Means of Defence? 16 EUR. J INT’L LAW 171, 195 (2005)). 
53  Murithi Mutiga, Are the Terrorists of Al-Shabaab about to Tear Kenya 
in Two?, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 4, 2015, 12:16 PM), http://www.theguardian 
.com/world/2015/apr/04/kenya-university-massacre-shabaab-divisions (“There 
have been media reports of collaboration in terms of training and exchanging 
ideas between Boko Haram and al-Shabaab, but it is essential to study the 
Shabaab’s aims in greater detail to see what their goals are.”) 
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Shabab’s activities in East Africa according to strict territorial 
limits obviates a full evidentiary analysis where the complete 
intensity and scope of the attacks, and the depth of their 
organization and planning, will not be considered.  
The third significant reason to implement Context when 
assessing jurisdiction is that innovative technologies have 
altered the manner of modern warfare. Such technologies are 
less constrained by geographical boundaries and, likewise, do 
not fall within the traditional characterization of an attack 
occurring at a specific time. Technological advancement has 
resulted in new tactics, such as cyber-attacks and drones. Both 
of these mechanisms lack territorial specificity (although drones 
can be controlled to a greater extent), and with cyber-attacks, it 
can be debated when an attack actually commences.54 The 
current territorial and temporal constraints imposed by the 
Statute do not suffice in accounting for these new technologies. 
While it is beyond the scope of this paper, efforts such as the 
Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Warfare are attempting to address the various technological 
advancements in contemporary conflicts.55 
The three factors outlined above signify the continually 
changing structure of international criminal law and the law of 
war. The Court has not achieved universal acceptance to date 
(especially in high conflict regions), and the actors and means 
involved in modern warfare are rapidly changing such that the 
international legal framework has not been able to follow suit. 
The following decisions, from both the ad hoc tribunals and the 
ICC, illustrate instances where judges have accounted for 
evidence presented by the prosecution extending beyond the 
statutory temporal and territorial limitations. 
 
 
 
                                               
54  For an example of submissions at the ICC in relation to cyber-attacks, 
see Peter Micek, Evidence of Communications Disruptions re: Investigation of 
Central African Republic for Crimes Against Humanity, ACCESS (Feb. 13, 
2014), https://www.accessnow.org/evidence-international-criminal-court-net-
shutdown-in-central-african-repub/. 
55  TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt, ed., 2013). 
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IV. Context Consideration at the Ad Hoc Tribunals 
 
As mentioned above, the ad hoc and hybrid tribunals are 
distinct from the ICC in that the former do not have referral 
mechanisms and are limited to a specific conflict. They are not 
permanent courts, and are arguably not committed to building a 
coherent and consistent policy when considering evidence and 
deciding what situations are ultimately to come within their 
jurisdiction. The decisions below concern evidentiary findings 
and, particularly, the admissibility of evidence outside statutory 
temporal and territorial limitations. The preliminary 
evidentiary issues in these decisions do not concern whether the 
case is properly before the tribunal. The accused has already 
been arrested and is before the tribunal. Rather, the legal 
questions pertain to the evidentiary scope to be considered when 
determining whether crimes within the tribunal’s jurisdiction 
have occurred. Conversely, in the ICC decisions also discussed 
below, questions concerning the Court’s jurisdiction over a 
particular situation or an accused—whether to commence an 
investigation or issue an arrest warrant—were at issue. 
 
i. Nahimana (ICTR) 
 
Ferdinand Nahimana was a Rwandan historian and 
founder of the radio station Radio Télévision Libre des Mille 
Collines. At the ICTR, it was alleged that in 1993, he carried out 
acts inciting genocide that continued until 1994 when the 
physical acts constituting the Rwandan genocide occurred. As 
the ICTR’s temporal jurisdiction began from January 1, 1994,56 
the defence argued that Nahimana’s comments before that date 
fell outside the ICTR’s jurisdiction. They also argued that the 
incitement to genocide was not a crime that continued to run 
from the moment the comments were uttered until the time the 
acts of genocide were committed in 1994. The Prosecutor, on the 
other hand, argued that “[l]ogically, matters which go towards 
proof of events happening in 1994 may antedate 1994,”57 and 
                                               
56  S.C. Res. 955, art. 7 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
57  Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeals Judgment, 
¶ 304 (Nov. 28 2007), http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/pdf/ 
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unless the ICTR Statute expressly prohibited the reception of 
evidence before 1994, the evidence should be admissible.58 The 
Prosecutor contended that the defence confused the concepts of 
jurisdiction and admissibility,59 with the latter being the means 
the Tribunal can use to decide the former.60 The Prosecutor also 
argued that Nahimana’s comments pre-dating the Tribunal’s 
temporal jurisdiction would be used to establish his mens rea. 
The Appeals Chamber relied on the strict wording of 
Article 7 of the ICTR Statute and the comments made in a 1995 
UN Secretary General Report61 in concluding that the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction would be limited to crimes commenced and 
concluded in 1994. The Appeals Chambers, however, did accede 
to the Prosecutor’s argument that evidence pre-1994 was 
admissible if it was relevant, of probative value, and there was 
no compelling reason to exclude it. The Appeals Chamber held 
that the pre-1994 evidence, to be admitted, should i) be aimed at 
clarifying a given context, ii) establish by inference the elements 
of criminal conduct occurring in 1994 or iii) demonstrate a 
deliberate pattern of conduct.62 The Appeals Chamber concluded 
that the Trial Chamber did not exceed its jurisdiction or breach 
trial fairness by relying on pre-1994 evidence.63 
The Appeals Chamber decision also discussed whether 
direct and public incitement to genocide occurring pre-1994 was 
                                               
NAHIMANA%20ET%20AL%20-%20APPEALS%20JUDGEMENT.pdf 
[hereinafter Nahimana Appeals Judgment]. 
58  Id. 
59  Admissibility here refers to evidentiary admissibility and is distinct 
from that in Article 17 of the Rome Statute, which concerns admissibility of a 
situation before the Court when a domestic jurisdiction is unwilling or unable 
to prosecute and the Court finds the matter meets the gravity and interests of 
justice thresholds. 
60  Nahimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 57, ¶ 304. 
61  The Report stated, “The temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal is limited 
to one year, beginning on 1 January 1994 and ending on 31 December 1994. 
Although the crash of the aircraft carrying the Presidents of Rwanda and 
Burundi on 6 April 1994 is considered to be the event that triggered the civil 
war and the acts of genocide that followed, the Council decided that the 
temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal would commence on 1 January 1994, in 
order to capture the planning stage of the crimes.” See U.N. Secretary-General, 
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council 
Resolution 995 (1994), ¶14, U.N. Doc. S/1995/134 (Feb. 13, 1995). 
62  Nahimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 57, ¶ 315. 
63  Id. ¶ 316, at 98. 
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a continuing crime with a persistent or ongoing course of conduct 
that, therefore, came within the ICTR’s jurisdiction. It concluded 
that incitement to commit genocide is an inchoate crime that “is 
completed as soon as the discourse in question is uttered or 
published, even though the effects of incitement may extend in 
time.”64 The Chamber, however, again noted that while 
Nahimana could not be convicted solely for comments pre-1994, 
the Trial Chamber could have considered those comments as 
contextual elements. The Chamber, for example, held that the 
pre-1994 comments inciting genocide could be used to explain 
how the radio station listeners perceived the 1994 broadcasts. 
The Appeals Chamber found the pre-1994 radio broadcasts 
admissible based on their relevance and probative value.65 
Nahimana did not use evidence outside its temporal 
jurisdiction to establish the actus reus of genocide or incitement 
to commit genocide. Rather, the tribunal admitted the evidence 
within the broader contextual analysis of the Rwandan genocide 
given its probative value and relevance to acts that actually 
occurred within 1994. The Appeals Chambers recognized the 
saliency of contextualizing serious crimes that may straddle 
both sides of temporal jurisdictional boundaries. Before physical 
acts of genocide are undertaken, an environment of revulsion 
and animosity must exist that takes time to develop.  
Nahimana’s broadcasts, both outside and inside the 
ICTR’s temporal jurisdiction, were relevant to establishing this 
animus, thereby leading to genocide, and subsequently to 
Nahimana’s conviction according to his role. Similarly, my 
argument for Context consideration to bolster the gravity 
requirement at the ICC requires that the elements of the crime 
in question, as a threshold, take place within the territorial and 
temporal jurisdictional limits. Similarly to Nahimana, where 
conduct by the same person in the course of the same conflict 
straddled temporal boundaries, armed conflicts considered at 
the ICC can straddle the Court’s temporal and/or territorial 
jurisdictional limits.  
 
 
                                               
64  Id. ¶ 723, at 230. 
65  Id. ¶ 725. 
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ii. Akayesu (ICTR) 
 
Jean-Paul Akayesu was a politician for the Republican 
Democratic Movement in Rwanda and was the mayor of the 
Taba Commune from April 1993 to June 1994. He was alleged to 
have acquiesced to and personally supervised the killing of 
Tutsis while a mayor. At the ICTR, he was charged with 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and violation of Common 
Article 3 to the Geneva Convention concerning conflicts of a non-
international nature.66 
At trial, the Tribunal opined that the indictment against 
Akayesu could not properly be understood without insight into 
the historical, political, and ethnic context of Rwanda. In that 
light, the Tribunal was required to consider extra-temporal 
evidence in order to determine the existence of genocidal policy. 
The Tribunal proceeded through Rwanda’s colonial history from 
the 19th century onwards. Prior to the Belgian occupation, the 
distinction between Hutu and Tutsi was merely of lineage and 
“one could move from one status to another, as one became rich 
                                               
66  Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention) art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 
75 U.N.T.S. 135. Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 provides: “. . . the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict 
shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: 
1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed 
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by 
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be 
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, 
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, 
the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place 
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:(a) violence to life and 
person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and 
torture;(b) taking of hostages;(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment;(d) the passing of sentences and the 
carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a 
regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.” 
Akayesu was also charged under Article 4(2)(e) of the additional protocol as 
incorporated by Article 4(e) (“[o]utrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any 
form of indecent assault”) of the Statute of the Tribunal. Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 4(e), June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
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or poor, or even through marriage.”67 The Tribunal explained 
that the permanent distinction between the two groups was 
introduced under the Belgian occupation in the 1930s, which 
mandated all Rwandans to carry identity cards specifying their 
designated group.68 The ethnic divide deepened as the Belgian 
government disproportionately favoured the Tutsi population 
while the Catholic Church further sought to illuminate the 
differences in each group.69  
The Tribunal then went on to discuss the power 
struggles, which perpetuated in Rwanda from the 1950s 
onwards as political parties divided on ethnic, rather than 
ideological, lines. The Tribunal explained the continued fighting 
between Tutsi rebels, organized both within Rwanda and 
externally through Tutsi exiles in Uganda, and the ruling 
government of President Habyarimana, who was pro-Hutu. The 
historical context was described up until the plane crash killing 
President Habyarimana and President Ntaryamirai of Burundi 
as they were returning from discussing peace accords in Dar-es-
Salaam with the disputing Rwandan factions.70 
While it was the April 1994 plane crash that constituted 
the immediate pre-cursor to the Rwandan Armed Forces (“RAF”) 
and the presidential guard killing various Tutsi members of the 
coalition government, and subsequently ordinary Tutsi citizens, 
the events following the crash did not occur in a vacuum and 
were necessary evidence to establish Akayesu’s genocidal intent. 
Absent this informative background, Akayesu was no more than 
a negligent politician who neither had the will nor the power to 
stop killings within his jurisdiction. In that case, the high 
threshold for establishing genocidal intent would not have been 
met. However, the context of the ethnic divisions that evolved 
over the preceding century better placed Akayesu’s actions and 
inactions within the realm of genocidal crimes falling within the 
ICTR’s jurisdiction. 
                                               
67  Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 81, 
at 47 (Sept. 2, 1998), http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/pdf/ 
AKAYESU%20-%20JUDGEMENT.pdf [hereinafter Akayesu Trial Judgment]. 
68  Id. ¶ 83, at 48. This practice was abolished after the 1994 Genocide. 
69  Id. ¶¶ 83-87, at 48-49. 
70  Id. ¶ 106, at 57. 
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iii. Taylor (SCSL) 
 
Charles Taylor was the president of Liberia from 1997 to 
2003. Pursuant to an agreement between the Government of 
Liberia and the United Nations, the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (“SCSL”) was formed in order to prosecute Taylor for his 
crimes committed as a rebel leader and, after his ascendency, as 
a president.71 The crux of the charges related to Taylor’s alleged 
support of the Revolutionary United Front (“RUF”), a rebel 
group whose goal was to overthrow the All People’s Congress 
(“APC”) Government of Sierra Leone. Taylor supplied arms and 
facilities to the RUF in exchange for blood diamonds. RUF’s role 
in Sierra Leone’s civil war resulted in thousands of civilian 
deaths. 
At trial, the defence brought a motion limiting evidence 
to the temporal and territorial scope as defined by the SCSL 
Statute.72 Taylor’s lawyers objected to the evidence of crimes 
allegedly committed in Liberia and evidence that pre-dated the 
“indictment period.” The Prosecution, conversely, argued that 
the Chamber was permitted to admit any relevant evidence as 
stated in Rule 89(C) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Evidence.73 The 
prosecution also argued that Taylor’s crimes were continuous in 
that his intention was formed prior to the Tribunal’s temporal 
mandate and continued after its mandate began, such that both 
the actus reus and mens rea could be established within the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction with the anterior temporal evidence 
                                               
71  Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 12-14 
(May 18, 2012), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/1283/SCSL-
03-01-T-1283.pdf [hereinafter Taylor Trial Judgment]. The specific indictment 
charged Taylor with crimes against humanity (murder, rape, sexual slavery, 
other inhumane acts and enslavement). Taylor was also charged under Article 
3 common to the Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol II for acts of 
terrorism, violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons. 
He was also charged with conscripting children under 15 years of age. 
72  Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Defence Motion to 
Exclude Evidence Falling Outside the Scope of the Indictment and/or the 
Jurisdiction of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, ¶¶ 3-4 (Sept. 24, 2010), 
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/1101/SCSL-03-01-T-
1086.PDF. 
73  See Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 71, ¶¶ 92-97, at 45-47 
(submissions of parties relating to limiting evidence to the Statute’s temporal 
and geographical jurisdiction). 
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serving as relevant context to Sierra Leone’s civil war and 
Taylor’s role in it. 
The Tribunal cited the Nahimana appeals decision, 
discussed above, for the principle that both the act and intention 
related to the crime alleged must be committed within the 
temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal.74 The Tribunal also 
considered the role of temporal jurisdiction in relation to a joint 
criminal enterprise. In this regard, it cited the Prlic judgment 
from the ICTY for the proposition that “only criminal conduct, in 
the form of a joint criminal enterprise or any other form of 
responsibility alleged in the indictment, taking place during the 
alleged material period [of the indictment] may form the basis 
for the conviction of the accused.” The Trial Chamber, 
nonetheless, adopted the principle from Nahimana that it could 
rely on evidence outside the Tribunal’s temporal scope i) to 
clarify a given context, ii) to establish by inference the element, 
in particular the mens rea, of criminal conduct occurring during 
the material period; or iii) to demonstrate a deliberate pattern 
of conduct.75   
For evidence outside a Tribunal’s temporal scope, the 
Trial Chamber stated that such evidence could only be used to 
establish the existence of a continuing crime that, while 
commencing anterior to the temporal period mandated under 
the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, continued into the Tribunal’s 
temporal mandate, such that “a conviction may be based only on 
that part of such conduct which occurs during the material 
period.”76 The prosecution must, nonetheless establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the required elements of a crime 
continued into the indictment period.  
As for evidence consistent with a pattern of conduct 
where some of that evidence falls outside the Tribunal’s 
temporal scope, Rule 93 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Evidence 
stated that such evidence may be admissible in the interests of 
justice. The Trial Chamber adopted the ICTR’s principal in 
Bagorosa77 that evidence of prior criminal offences is not 
                                               
74  Id. ¶ 103, at 49. 
75  Id. ¶ 101 (citing Nahimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 58, ¶ 315). 
76  Id. ¶ 104. 
77  Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on 
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admissible simply for establishing the accused’s propensity to 
commit an offence. Even if the prior crime was identical to the 
one of which an accused is charged, evidence outside of the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction to establish proclivity to commit a crime 
will not be admitted. Similar to the evidentiary principle in 
domestic jurisdictions,78 the Tribunal agreed to accept similar-
conduct evidence outside its temporal mandate only when “it is 
probative of some peculiar feature of the case” or where it is 
“highly distinct and unique such that it amounts to a signature 
of an identifiable person.”79 The Trial Chamber analogized that 
the three exceptions to admitting evidence outside a tribunal’s 
temporal jurisdiction apply equally to admitting evidence 
outside its geographical scope. 
 
iv. Haradinaj (ICTY) 
 
During the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, Ramush 
Haradinaj was the commander of the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(“KLA”). At the ICTY, he was charged with war crimes and 
crimes against humanity against Serbs, Romanians, and 
Albanians between March and September 1998, during the 
Kosovo war.80 After a partial retrial ordered by the Appeals 
Chamber subsequent to Haradinaj’s case being dismissed, he 
was acquitted of all charges due to a lack of evidence. 
In May 2011, Haradinaj brought a motion before the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber with regard to the partial retrial 
arguing that the indictment included charges that fell outside 
the retrial’s scope. Specifically, he argued that any evidence not 
relevant to the Jablanica / Jabllanice area should be excluded. 
Conversely, the prosecution argued that the evidence relating to 
                                               
Admissibility of Proposed Testimony of Witness DBY, ¶ 12 (Sept. 18, 2003) 
aff’d ICTR-98-41-AR93, (Dec. 19, 2003) [hereinafter Bagosora Decision on 
Witness DBY]. 
78  See R. v. Smith, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915; R. v. Handy, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 908 
(Canadian cases concerning similar-fact evidence). 
79  Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 71, ¶ 108 (citing Bagorosa Appeals 
Judgment). 
80  Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84bis-AR73.1, Decision on 
Haradinaj’s Appeal on Scope of Partial Retrial (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia May 31, 2011), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/acdec/en/ 
110531.pdf. 
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Haradinaj’s involvement outside the Jablanica / Jabllanice area 
was relevant to demonstrate a continued pattern of conduct and 
that the events in those areas did not occur in isolation, but 
rather “[t]ook place in a context of violence against perceived 
KLA opponents.”81  
The Appeals Chamber ruled that evidence submitted 
regarding events outside the Jablanica / Jabllanice area was still 
relevant even though it pertained to charges previously dropped. 
The Appeals Chamber accepted the prosecution’s argument that 
the evidence was relevant to the common purpose required to be 
shown amongst a Joint Criminal Enterprise (“JCE”).82 
 
V. Context at the ICC 
 
The decisions cited below from the ICC, in counter-
distinction to the ad hoc and hybrid tribunal decisions discussed 
above, pertain to the admissibility of an entire situation, as in 
the case of the Gaza flotilla incident, or a particular case, as in 
the arrest warrant decisions for Al-Bashir and Gaddafi. While at 
their root these decisions are evidentiary ones, they all relate to 
threshold issues of the scope of temporality and territoriality in 
determining whether the ICC should assert its jurisdiction. 
 
i. The Situation in Libya 
 
The situation in Libya, as to the oppositional suppression 
by the Gaddafi government from February 2011 onwards, was 
referred to the ICC by the UNSC pursuant to Resolution 1970.83 
After conducting an investigation, the OTP requested arrest 
warrants for Muammar Gaddafi, his son, Saif Al Islam Gaddafi, 
and the country’s head of intelligence, Abdullah Al-Senussi. 
Specifically, the referral delineated acts committed by these 
three individuals from February 15 to February 28, 2011. 
Despite Libya not being a State Party to the Court, the UNSC 
                                               
81  Id. ¶ 38. 
82  Id. 
83  S.C. Res. 1970, ¶¶ 4-8 (Feb. 26, 2011) (referring the situation in Libya 
to the ICC; mandating that Libyan authorities cooperate fully with the Court’s 
investigation; urging non-State Parties to cooperate fully). 
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referral brought Libya within the Court’s jurisdiction for the 
purpose of acts alleged in the referral.84 
The application for the arrest warrant contended that the 
three individuals committed the crimes against humanity of 
murder85 and persecution against an identifiable group.86 To 
establish crimes against humanity, there must be an “attack 
directed against any civilian population”87 via an organizational 
policy. Given the limited temporal jurisdiction provided in the 
referral, the Pre-Trial Chamber, in its decision to issue the 
arrest warrant, relied on a speech by Muammar Gaddafi given 
on January 15, 2011 (which is outside the referral’s temporal 
scope) in order to find a reasonable basis to proceed. In the 
January 2011 and other speeches, Muammar and Saif Al Islam 
Gaddafi condemned the ongoing Tunisian uprisings and “stated 
their intention to suppress any kind of demonstrations against 
the regime.”88 
The Pre-Trial Chamber utilized that speech—as first 
referred to in the Prosecutor’s application for an arrest 
warrant—to establish reasonable grounds to believe that an 
                                               
84  Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, ICC-01/11-12, 
Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to 
Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar GADDAFI, Saif Al-Islam GADDAFI 
and Abdullah AL-SENUSSI, ¶ 10 (June 27, 2011), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/ CR2011_08350.PDF [hereinafter Situation in the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya]. The specific alleged grounds for arrest were 
stated as:Count 1: Murder constituting a crime against humanity (Article 
7(l)(a) and Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute) 
From February 15, 2011, onwards, GADDAFI, as indirect 
perpetrators, and SAIF AL ISLAM and AL-SENUSSI, as indirect co-
perpetrators, committed crimes against humanity in the form of murder 
across Libya in, inter alia, Tripoli, Benghazi, and Misrata, through the 
Libyan State apparatus and Security Forces in violation of Articles 
7(1)(a) and 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute; 
Count 2: Persecution (Article 7(l)(h) and Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome 
Statute) 
From February 15, 2011, onwards, GADDAFI, as indirect perpetrator, 
and SAIF AL ISLAM and AL-SENUSSI, as indirect co-perpetrators, 
committed crimes against humanity in the form of persecution across 
Libya in, inter alia, Tripoli, Benghazi. 
85  Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 7(1)(a). 
86  Id. 
87  Id. 
88  Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, supra note 84, ¶ 26. 
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organizational policy to suppress potential dissenters to the 
Gaddafi government was present within the referral’s temporal 
scope. It is arguable that an organizational policy could be 
established if the temporal scope of the referral was limited to 
evidence from February 15 to February 28, 2011, as there were 
only two speeches by the accused which referred to the uprisings 
and the possibility of suppression within Libya during that time. 
The Pre-Trial Chamber concluded, after taking into 
account evidence before and during the referral period, that 
there was a reasonable basis to believe that crimes against 
humanity, which are within the Court’s jurisdiction, had taken 
place. The Court concluded that there existed sufficient evidence 
to believe that an organizational plan and policy, as required by 
the Statute, was present in the Gaddafi regime after the 
uprisings began in Tunisia and Egypt. The Chamber specifically 
found “reasonable grounds to believe that the highest level of the 
State apparatus, through the legal system, the media monopoly, 
and the Security Forces, designed a system which enables the 
monitoring, control and repression of any actual or perceived 
opposition to Muammar Gaddafi’s regime.”89 
While the context of this decision may be within the 
context of a particular case in order to establish the 
organizational policy requirement of crimes against humanity, 
this analysis is equally applicable as precedent to the OTP, and 
the Pre-Trial Chamber in authorization decisions, adopting a 
policy of expansive information collection from both inside and 
outside the Court’s temporal and territorial jurisdiction to meet 
the requisite gravity threshold in order to commence an 
investigation.  
 
ii. Situation in Sudan 
 
The situation in Sudan was another UNSC referral under 
Chapter VII of its Charter. The OTP sought an arrest warrant 
for Omar Al-Bashir, the Sudanese president, for committing 
“genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes against 
members of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups in Darfur 
                                               
89  Id. ¶ 24. 
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from 2003 to 14 July 2008.”90 Those groups were accused of being 
allied with organized armed groups opposing the Sudanese 
Government in Darfur. Al-Bashir was accused of ordering the 
suppression of Darfurian civilians through the Janjaweed 
militia, Sudanese Police Forces, National Intelligence and 
Security Service (“NISS”), and the Humanitarian Aid 
Commission (“HAC”).91 
In its arrest warrant application for Al-Bashir, the 
prosecution made an inferential argument to establish genocidal 
intent.92 In support of this argument, the prosecution relied on 
documentary evidence from the early and mid-1990s. The 
documents proffered were:  
 
1) a Secret Bulletin issued by the Sudanese intelligence 
services in 1992 advocating for the execution of Fur from key 
government positions, intelligence services, the military and 
police;  
2) a decree issued by President Al-Bashir in 1992 dividing 
Darfur into three states with the “aim and effect of diluting the 
political strength of the Fur;”  
3) a reform law enacted in March 1995 reducing the 
Masalit power over land; and  
4) a 1986 Armed Forces Memorandum establishing the 
chain of command in which President Al-Bashir was in charge 
of the armed forces.93  
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber concluded that none of those 
documents were relevant  to establish genocidal intent on the 
Sudanese government’s part.The Armed Forces Memorandum 
establishing a chain of command between Sudan’s civil 
government and the military forces was not necessarily 
                                               
90  Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Decision on 
the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶ 4 (Mar. 4, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords 
/CR2009_01517.PDF [hereinafter Situation in Darfur, Sudan]. 
91  Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Case Information 
Sheet, 1 (March 26, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir/Documents 
/AlBashirEng.pdf. 
92  Situation in Darfur, Sudan, supra note 90, ¶ 147. 
93  Id. ¶ 166. 
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unlawful.94 The Pre-Trial Chamber stated, “evidence of close 
coordination provides indicia of the existence of a well 
organised governmental structure through which decisions 
taken in the upper levels of the [Government] can be effectively 
implemented.”95 
The majority of the Court, while not admitting evidence 
outside the referral’s temporal scope, concluded there was a 
reasonable basis to believe that crimes against humanity and 
war crimes had been committed. However, the majority did not 
find sufficient evidence of genocide. In her dissent, Judge Anita 
Uṧacka concluded that Al-Bashir possessed sufficient genocidal 
intent for the arrest warrant to include the charge of genocide. 
Unfortunately, while Judge Uṧacka relied on contextual factors 
to determine genocidal intent, the extent of her dissent was 
limited to matters falling within the referral’s temporal scope. 
The Al-Bashir decision illustrates an instance where the 
Court did not admit extra-temporal evidence in its 
determination. Nonetheless, what must be kept in mind is that 
the standard of proof at the arrest warrant stage is higher than 
at the preliminary examination and investigation stages.96 The 
herein argument for Context advocates that extra-temporal and 
extra-territorial information should be aggregated with 
information from within the Court’s temporal and territorial 
jurisdiction at the initial stages of the prosecutorial process in 
order to fulfill the gravity threshold where bifurcating the 
consideration of that information would not meet the threshold. 
Therefore, this decision does not necessarily undermine the 
Court’s ability to consider Context nor serves as a contrary 
precedent.  
 
                                               
94  Id. ¶¶ 167-69. 
95 Situation in Darfur, Sudan, supra note 90, ¶ 169. 
96 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 58(1)(a) (expounding the standard 
for issuing an arrest as “reasonable grounds to believe”); see also Manuel 
Ventura, The ‘Reasonable Basis to Proceed’ Threshold in the Kenya and Côte 
d’Ivoire Proprio Motu Investigation Decisions: The International Criminal 
Court’s Lowest Evidentiary Standard?, in EDUARDO VALENCIA-OSPINA, ED, THE 
LAW & PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 48-80 (2013) 
(comparing the “reasonable basis to believe” standard with the “reasonable 
grounds to believe” standard). 
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iii. The Situation in Comoros 
 
In May 2013, the Union of Comoros, a small island nation 
off the coast of East Africa, made a referral to the ICC for crimes 
within the Court’s jurisdiction allegedly committed by the Israeli 
Defence Forces (“IDF”) when their helicopters surrounded and 
shot at aid workers aboard a humanitarian flotilla attempting to 
deliver aid to the Gaza Strip.97 The majority of the alleged crimes 
took place on the MV Maria Marmara, a vessel registered with 
Comoros, and thus falling within the Court’s territorial 
jurisdiction. The attack resulted in nine deaths.98 In its referral, 
Comoros discussed the attack’s wider political context: 
 
The attack on the flotilla must be seen in the wider context of 
the Israel-Palestine conflict. It is a follow up to and a 
consequence of Operation Cast Lead (December 2008 – 
January 2009), which is still the subject of investigation by the 
Human Rights Council and was condemned by the Goldstone 
inquiry report. Furthermore, the blockade of Gaza has been 
condemned by the United Nations and the international 
community at large as a collective punishment that deprives 
the people of Gaza of the most basic of commodities and 
services. Indeed, the UNFFM99 described the situation in Gaza 
as totally intolerable and unacceptable. The situation in Gaza 
is grave and the attack on the flotilla, which was aimed at 
perpetuating the situation, must therefore meet the test of 
gravity.100 
 
Operation Cast Lead was a military campaign by the 
Israeli Government aimed at ceasing rocket fire into Israel by 
Hamas militants. The campaign, which lasted from December 
27, 2008 to January 18, 2009, bombarded key sites in the Gaza 
Strip, including police stations and military outposts in Gaza, 
                                               
97  Referral, Int’l Crim. Ct., Union of Comoros, May 14, 2013 (the Union 
of Comoros referred the matter of the May 31, 2010 Israeli raid on the 
Humanitarian Aid Flotilla bound for Gaza Strip to the Prosecutor for the 
International Criminal Court, pursuant to Articles 12, 13, and 14 of the Rome 
Statute). 
98  Id. ¶ 12. 
99  Acronym for ‘United Nations Fact Finding Mission.’ 
100  Referral, Int’l Crim. Ct., Union of Comoros, supra note 97. 
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Khan Yunis and Rafah. Israel also declared a blockade of the 
Gaza Strip on January 3, 2009.101 The conflict resulted in 1,417 
Palestinian deaths. Moreover, as stated by the United Nations 
Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, there was 
“massive destruction of livelihoods and a significant 
deterioration of infrastructure and basic services.”102  
According to the World Food Programme, anywhere from 
35% to 60% of Gaza’s agricultural industry was destroyed. The 
UN Emergency Relief Coordinator stated after the conflict that 
only 120 truckloads daily were getting into Gaza, whereas 500 
truckloads, at minimum, were required.103 There were also 
allegations of the Hamas government diverting humanitarian 
aid.104 The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs’ Gaza Humanitarian Situation Report stated that 80% of 
the Gazan population could not support themselves and were 
therefore dependent on humanitarian aid.105 With this 
background, the Gaza aid flotilla—consisting of four cargo 
vessels and four passenger vessels occupying approximately 700 
people from 36 countries—set out to deliver humanitarian aid to 
the Gaza Strip in May 2010. The flotilla and its passengers were 
unarmed, with the vessels containing only humanitarian aid.  
After the Prosecutor’s decision to not investigate the 
alleged crimes aboard the flotilla for want of gravity and not 
being in the ‘interest of justice,’ representatives on behalf of 
Comoros brought an application pursuant to Article 53(3) asking 
the Pre-Trial Chamber to make a request to the Prosecutor to 
reconsider her decision. For our purposes, the pertinent part of 
Comoros’s application is the political context, or as framed in 
this paper the extra-territorial information relevant to the 
                                               
101  Human Rights Comm., Report of the United Nations Fact Finding 
Mission on the Gaza Conflict, ¶¶ 185, 831, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (2009). 
102  G.A. Res. ES-10/2, Illegal Israeli Actions in Occupied East Jerusalem 
and the Rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Jan. 2, 2009), [hereinafter 
Illegal Israeli Actions]. 
103  Israel Must Allow Full Access for Aid and Supplies to Rehabilitate 
Gaza – UN Relief Chief, U.N. BLOG TODAY (Jan. 27, 2009, 5:10 PM), http://un-
blog-985-320-6006.blogspot.com/2009/01/israel-must-allow-full-access-for-
aid.html. 
104  Id. 
105  Illegal Israeli Actions, supra note 102. 
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Israel-Palestinian conflict, as a result of the pre-existing 
blockade of the Gaza Strip. 
Comoros argued that “the Prosecutor certainly can take 
account of all acts that occurred during the blockade and 
occupation in order to determine whether the acts on the vessels 
over which she has jurisdiction could constitute war crimes of 
sufficient gravity under the ICC’s Statute in order to decide 
whether they should be investigated.”106 For Comoros, acts 
outside the Court’s territorial jurisdiction could be taken into 
account in the Prosecutor’s determination to investigate the 
situation.107 As a result, Comoros contended, had the Prosecutor 
considered the wider context of the blockade and occupation 
following Operation Cast Lead—both aboard the MV Mari 
Marmara and within the Gaza Strip (while also extending the 
timeline to before the flotilla attack)—she would have 
determined that the attack met the gravity threshold.108 
According to Comoros, if the blockade was unlawful by 
disproportionately targeting civilians or amounting to collective 
punishment (as concluded by the International Committee of the 
Red Cross and various UN bodies), then all the acts that followed 
in enforcing the blockade would themselves be unlawful.109 It 
also argued that there was a reasonable basis to believe, unless 
and until disproved by an evidence-based investigation, that the 
particular IDF operation to intercept the flotilla formed part of 
a plan and policy to uphold the unlawful blockade. In this 
regard, Comoros utilized the language of Article 8(1) of the 
Statute, which only requires that crimes be committed as part of 
a policy, plan, or large-scale pattern. It argued that the Statute 
contained no express provision that each act constituting the 
plan, policy, or large-scale pattern must come within the Court’s 
temporal or territorial jurisdiction.110 
The argument by Comoros for the consideration of 
political context is, as far as can be discerned, the first such 
                                               
106  Comoros Application, supra note 24, ¶ 14. Recall that at the time of 
the flotilla attack, the State of Palestine was not a State Party to the Rome 
Statute. 
107  Id. ¶ 15. 
108  Id. 
109  Id. ¶ 16. 
110  Id. ¶ 68. 
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argument brought before the ICC. While the decisions from the 
ad hoc tribunals and ICC cited above may in vacuo have 
admitted evidence outside the Court’s traditional temporal or 
territorial jurisdiction, those decisions have not translated into 
any precedent. Comoros was, in effect, arguing that the Court 
should aggregate evidence from the flotilla attack with evidence 
from attacks during Operation Cast Lead and the subsequent 
blockade when deciding whether the gravity threshold is 
fulfilled.  
The argument of this article mirrors that of Comoros – to 
use an aggregate expansive approach to information collection 
at the preliminary examination and investigation stages to 
assist in fulfilling the gravity requirement. This approach can, 
and should be, considered in every ICC situation and case. 
However, in employing this expansive approach to jurisdiction, 
the two caveats discussed above must be taken into account. 
First, information from attacks both inside and outside the 
Court’s traditional jurisdiction must be from the same conflict. 
Second, an expansive approach should only be used when an 
otherwise bifurcated approach to determining jurisdiction would 
not meet the gravity threshold.  
 
VI. Context and Evidentiary Admissibility 
 
As in domestic legal systems, the ICC distinguishes 
between evidentiary admissibility and the weight to be given to 
admissible evidence.111 Whereas admissibility of evidence is a 
threshold inquiry, it may be given little or no weight after its 
admission. The admissibility and, ultimately, the weight to be 
accorded to evidence is decided by the Pre-Trial Chamber judge 
or the panel at trial. As there is no jury system at the ICC, judges 
are the ultimate finders of fact. As the SCSL Trial Chamber 
stated in Brima et al., “[i]ssues before the Special Court are 
conducted before professional judges, who by virtue of their 
education and experience are able to ponder independently 
                                               
111  The reference to evidentiary admissibility here is distinct from the 
concept of jurisdictional admissibility in Articles 17 and 19 of the Statute, 
which concerns whether a matter is of sufficient gravity and in the ‘interests 
of justice’ to warrant coming before the Court. 
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without prejudice to each and every case which will be brought 
before them.”112 The same principle would apply to the ICC, in 
which complete discretion is given to judges as to what evidence 
is admissible and, subsequently, the weight it receives.  
The Statute has various provisions concerning 
evidentiary admissibility. Upon a motion by either party, the 
Trial Chamber can make a ruling “on the admissibility or 
relevance of evidence.”113 In deciding on admissibility, the Court 
balances the evidence’s probative value against “any prejudice 
that such evidence may cause to a fair trial or to a fair evaluation 
of the testimony of a witness.”114 Conversely, the Court’s Rules 
outline that evidence deemed “irrelevant or inadmissible shall 
not be considered.”115 
As with the IMT, the ad hoc tribunals use an inquisitorial 
model for admissibility, with a loose evidentiary threshold. The 
IMT Charter articulated this principle by stating, “[t]he 
Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. It 
shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious 
and non-technical procedure, and shall admit any evidence 
which it deems to be of probative value.”116 The ICTY, ICTR, and 
ECCC also emphasised relevance and probity when making 
decisions on the admissibility of evidence.117 The SCSL took a 
more expansive approach to evidentiary admissibility by 
                                               
112  Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Decision on 
the Prosecution Motion for Concurrent Hearing of Evidence Common to Cases 
SCSL-2004-15-PT and SCSL-2004-16-PT, ¶ 38 (May 11, 2004). 
113  Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 64(9). 
114  Id. art. 69(4). 
115  ICC-ASP/1/3, and Coor.1 (2002), Rule 64(3). 
116  Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War 
Criminals of the European Axis Powers and Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal, ¶ 19, Aug. 8, 1945, 2 U.N.T.S. 279. 
117  See, e.g., ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 89(C)-(D) (July 
8, 2015) (as amended) [hereinafter ICTY Rules] (Rule 89(D) states that “[a] 
Chamber may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial.”); ECCC Internal Rules, Rules 
81(1), 87(2), Rev. 9 (July 16, 2016) (as revised) [hereinafter ECCC Rules]; STL 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 149(c) (2009), STL-BD-2009-01-Rev.6-
Coor.1 (Apr. 3, 2014) (as corrected) [hereinafter STL RPE] (“[a] Chamber may 
admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value.”); see also 
id. Rule 149(d) (“[a] Chamber may exclude evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial.”). 
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allowing its chamber to admit any relevant evidence without 
conducting a balancing test.118 
At the ICC, the threshold of admitting evidence is lower 
at the investigation and confirmation of charges stages than at 
trial. At the confirmation stage, evidentiary challenges have, by 
and large, failed and only been successful in lessening its 
weight.119 In Lubanga, the Trial Chamber held that “[t]here 
should be no automatic reasons for either admitting or excluding 
a piece of evidence, but instead the court should consider the 
position overall.”120 In the same decision, the Trial Chamber 
stated, “the Chamber must be careful not to impose artificial 
limits on its ability to consider any piece of evidence freely, 
subject to the requirements of fairness.”121 Moreover, the Trial 
Chamber must first “ensure that the evidence is prima facie 
relevant to the trial, in that it relates to the matters that are 
properly to be considered by the Chamber in its investigation of 
the charges against the accused and its consideration of the 
views and concerns of participating victims.”122 The Trial 
Chamber must then assess whether the evidence has probative 
value.123 
In Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber held: 
 
                                               
118  SCSL Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 89(C) (May 28, 2010) (as 
amended) [hereinafter SCSL RPE]. 
119  Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-717, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 70 (Sept. 30, 2008), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2008_05172.PDF [hereinafter Katanga] (Pre-trial 
Chamber evidentiary rulings do not extend to the Trial Chamber); see id. ¶ 
189. The Pre-Trial Chamber also stated, “should charges against the suspects 
be confirmed, any ruling on the admissibility of a particular item of evidence 
for the purposes of the confirmation hearing and the present decision will not 
preclude a subsequent determination of the admissibility of that same evidence 
later in the proceedings because the ‘admission of evidence’ [at the pre-trial 
stage] is without prejudice to the Trial Chamber’s exercise of its functions and 
powers to make a final determination as to the admissibility and probative 
value of any evidence.” Id. ¶ 71; see also id. ¶ 193. 
120  Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1399, Decision on 
the Admissibility of Four Documents, ¶ 29 (June 13, 2008), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2008_03425.PDF. 
121  Id. 
122  Id. ¶ 27. 
123  Id. ¶ 28. 
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[U]nder Article 69(4) of the Statute the Chamber may exercise 
its discretion when determining the relevance and/or 
admissibility of any item of evidence. According to Article 69(4) 
of the Statute, probative value is one of the factors to be taken 
into consideration when assessing the admissibility of a piece 
of evidence. Therefore, in the Chamber’s view it must look at 
the intrinsic coherence of any item of evidence and declare 
inadmissible those items of evidence of which probative value 
is deemed prima facie absent after such an analysis. Any other 
assessment of the probative value of any given item of evidence 
will be made in light of the whole body of evidence introduced 
at the confirmation hearing.124 
 
The above background to the ICC’s approach to 
evidentiary admissibility, which falls in line with the rules and 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, establishes that the Court 
will cast a wide net in determining what evidence to consider. In 
this vein, the criteria for admitting evidence lies in its relevance 
and probative value (judged against its prejudicial effect), rather 
than a strict construction of the Statute’s temporal and 
territorial parameters. I correlate the Court’s approach to 
evidentiary admissibility with what the OTP and Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s approach should be when collecting information at 
the preliminary examination and investigation stages. The OTP 
and Pre-Trial Chamber, when determining whether to consider 
information, is best advised to employ an expansive approach 
prioritizing relevance and probity, rather than from where and 
when the information originates. In the midst of the same 
conflict where the gravity threshold would not otherwise be met, 
the OTP and Pre-Trial Chamber can consider information 
equally from times and places both inside and outside the 
Court’s traditional temporal and territorial jurisdiction. Only 
then will the Court be able to adequately consider the entire 
nature of a conflict, especially one that transcends State borders 
and occurs over a prolonged period of time.  
As in Nahimana, the admitted information, if outside the 
Court’s temporal or territorial jurisdiction, would be prohibited 
from use to establish the required actus reus and mens rea of the 
                                               
124  Katanga, supra note 119, ¶ 77. 
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crimes in question. However, if such information is relevant and 
of probative value, it can be considered in conjunction with 
information within the Court’s strict jurisdiction to conclude 
that an act meets the gravity threshold to commence a formal 
investigation. In other words, simply because information 
presented to the OTP or the Pre-Trial Chamber does not meet 
the Statute’s strict temporal or territorial parameters, it does 
not mean that it is not relevant or probative. This is especially 
true when during the same conflict there is information from 
attacks occurring within the Court’s temporal and territorial 
jurisdiction. At the preliminary examination, investigation and, 
if needed, authorization stages, relevant and probative 
information can, and should, be considered both inside and 
outside the Statute’s strict jurisdictional parameters. 
Nonetheless, as established by the ad hoc tribunals and the 
Court in the case law above, the required elements of the crime 
in question must take place within the Court’s jurisdictional 
limitations. This requirement is in line with my assertion that 
for Context to apply, one of the four bases of jurisdiction as laid 
out in the Statute must first be established.  
In sum, the Court’s admissibility of evidence has 
prioritized relevance and probity. Similarly, during the 
preliminary examination and investigation stages, the OTP and 
Pre-Trial Chamber should employ the same criteria of relevance 
and probity when considering information. The OTP and Pre-
Trial Chamber can, and should, consider information from 
attacks both inside and outside the Court’s temporal or 
territorial jurisdiction when those attacks occur in the midst of 
the same conflict and, if otherwise considered in isolation, would 
not meet the gravity threshold. This approach is justified 
according to both the Statute’s procedural framework and 
intentional textual ambiguity of the gravity threshold, as 
Section V will now outline. 
 
VII. Justifying the Use of Context in the Rome 
Statute 
 
I divide the justifications for Context consideration into 
procedural and textual justifications. While the procedural 
justification outlined below is more of an overview of the existing 
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prosecutorial process, the textual justification delves into 
specific statutory provisions. I focus on these two strands of 
justification to illustrate that my argument for Context does not 
require any amendments to the Statute or its accompanying 
documents. On the contrary, the OTP, and subsequently the 
Court, can expand temporal and territorial jurisdiction without 
reading any additional text into the Statute or interpreting the 
Statute in a manner contrary to its purposes outlined in its 
Preamble.  
 
a. Procedural Justification – ‘The Funnel Approach’ 
 
The Statute distinguishes between “preliminary 
examinations,” “situations,” and “cases,” wherein the former two 
terms are broader and in relation to a referral before an arrest 
warrant is issued for a particular accused. A case must always 
be within a situation, which is always preceded by a preliminary 
examination. As the Court stated in the Kenya authorization 
decision in relation to post election violence in 2007-08, 
prosecution proceeds in stages that begin with a situation and 
proceed to a case where one or more suspects have been 
identified.125 As Phillippe Kirsch has stated, “the general 
approach of referring ‘situations,’ rather than ‘cases,’ seems a 
prudent one. This helps reduce the arguably unseemly prospect 
of State Parties referring complaints against specific 
individuals, which might create a perception of using the Court 
to ‘settle scores.’”126 
The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a 
crime referred to in Article 5 if a situation in which one or more 
                                               
125  Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09-19, Decision 
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya (March 31, 2010), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2010_02399.PDF (“[T]he Chamber 
wishes to underline that the Statute is drafted in a manner which tends to 
solve questions related to admissibility at different stages of the proceedings 
up until trial. These stages begin with a ‘situation’ and end with a concrete 
‘case’, where one or more suspects have been identified for the purpose of 
prosecution.”). 
126  PHILIPPE KIRSCH & DARRYL ROBINSON, THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, A COMMENTARY 623 (Antonio Cassese, Paola 
Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002). 
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of such crimes appear to have been committed is referred to the 
Prosecutor by (a) a State Party; or (b) the UN Security 
Council.127 The purpose of a referral is to request the Prosecutor 
to investigate a situation to determine whether one or more 
persons could be charged with a crime within the Court’s 
jurisdiction.128 While the OTP can proceed with an investigation 
of a situation if it has been referred by the UNSC or by a State 
Party, for an investigation initiated proprio motu, the 
Prosecutor, upon concluding a reasonable basis to proceed with 
an investigation of a situation, must request authorization from 
the Pre-Trial Chamber.129 
Regulation 29 of the Office of the Prosecutor gives the 
prosecutor discretion in deciding whether there exists a 
reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, taking into 
account jurisdiction, admissibility (including gravity), and the 
interests of justice.130 In November 2013, the OTP published a 
Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, in which it 
recognized guiding principles of independence, impartiality, and 
objectivity in its preliminary examinations in determining 
whether to initiate an investigation.131 Citing Article 42 of the 
                                               
127  Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 13. 
128  Id. art. 14. 
129  Id. art. 15(3). 
130  Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-BD/05-01-09, 
Regulation 29 (Apr. 23, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/female 
counsel/RegulationsOTPEng.pdf. The full text of Regulation 29 states: 
1. In acting under article 15, paragraph 3, or article 53, paragraph 1, 
the Office shall produce an internal report analysing the 
seriousness of the information and considering the factors set out 
in article 53, paragraph 1 (a) to (c), namely issues of jurisdiction, 
admissibility (including gravity), as well as the interests of justice, 
pursuant to rules 48 and 104. The report shall be accompanied by 
a recommendation on whether there is a reasonable basis to 
initiate an investigation. 
2. In order to assess the gravity of the crimes allegedly committed in 
the situation the Office shall consider various factors including 
their scale, nature, manner of commission, and impact. 
3. Based on the report, the Prosecutor shall determine whether there 
is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation. 
4. The evaluation shall continue for as long as the situation remains 
under investigation. 5. In acting under article 53, paragraph 2, the 
Office shall apply mutatis mutandis sub-regulations 1 to 4. 
131  See Policy Paper on Preliminary Examination, supra note 13, § III. 
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Statute, the OTP held that independence means that “decisions 
shall not be influenced or altered by the presumed or known 
wishes of any party, or in connection with efforts to secure 
cooperation.”132 Impartiality means selecting situations in a non-
partisan manner and applying the same methodology and 
standards to each examination. Lastly, objectivity refers to the 
OTP considering incriminating and exonerating circumstances 
equally.133 
Prosecutorial impartiality and independence have also 
been defined by the ECHR. In order to establish independence, 
the ECHR has stated that there must be regard to, inter alia, 
the manner of appointment, the existence of guarantees against 
outside pressure, and whether the Tribunal presents an 
appearance of independence.134 For impartiality, the Tribunal 
must be subjectively free of personal prejudice or bias, and must 
be objectively impartial in that it must offer sufficient 
guarantees so as to exclude any legitimate doubt of partiality.135 
In this regard, both the Policy Paper and the ECHR 
jurisprudence demonstrate a concern with the presence of 
outside pressure and personal bias when selecting which 
matters to prosecute. The ECHR adds factors relating to outside 
appearance that would suggest it retains a higher threshold for 
prosecutorial independence and impartiality that is not 
considered by the OTP in its Policy Paper.  
The Policy Paper outlines a four-phase process for the 
OTP to determine what situations warrant investigation. Phase 
1 involves an initial assessment to determine whether the 
situation in question falls within the traditional notions of 
jurisdiction, as discussed above.136 Evidence falling outside the 
traditional notions of jurisdiction can “be revisited in light of new 
information or circumstances, such as a change in the 
jurisdictional situation.”137 Phase 2 examines the Court’s 
                                               
132   Id. ¶ 26; see also Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 42(1), (5), (7). 
133   See Policy Paper on Preliminary Examination, supra note 13, ¶ 41. 
134   Morris v. United Kingdom, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 387 ¶ 58 (2002). 
135  Id.; see also Findlay v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22107/93 Eur. 
Comm’n H.R. ¶ 76 (Feb. 25, 2997), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58016. 
136  Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 13. 
137  Id.  ¶ 79. 
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jurisdiction under both territorial jurisdiction138 and subject 
matter jurisdiction.139 Phase 2 is more specific than Phase 1 in 
that it only considers communications to the OTP that were not 
rejected in Phase 1. Phase 3 conducts both complementarity and 
gravity analyses, and results in an Article 17 Report.140 Phase 4 
examines whether the investigation is in the interests of justice, 
as required by Article 53(1). As of 2015, the Office of the 
Prosecutor has opened 22 preliminary examinations, twelve of 
which proceeded to a formal investigation and four to a decision 
not to proceed with an investigation.141 The OTP has decided not 
to proceed with investigations in situations in Iraq (gravity 
threshold required under Article 53 not met),142 Venezuela,143 
Korea (no subject matter jurisdiction),144 and Palestine (not a 
recognized state at time of preliminary examination).145 
The multistep ICC prosecution commences with a 
preliminary examination, wherein the OTP considers 
communications by State Parties or the UNSC. It then narrows 
to a “situation” framed by definitive territorial and temporal 
limits, and then narrows further to the issuance of an arrest 
warrant for the accused within those territorial and temporal 
parameters. I term this process the Funnel Approach to 
jurisdiction. The Funnel Approach—dwindling the scope of 
prosecution from a preliminary examination based on a referral, 
or initiated proprio motu, to jurisdiction over a particular 
situation and then to a particular accused—is unique to 
international criminal law.  
                                               
138  Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 1, 12. 
139  Id. art. 5. 
140  Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 13, ¶ 82. 
141  SCHABAS, supra note 12, at 74. 
142  Letters to Senders re Iraq, Office of the Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. CT. 
(Feb. 9, 2006), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/FD042F2E-678E-4EC6-
8121-690BE61D0B5A/143682/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February 
_2007.pdf. 
143  Letters to Senders re Venezuela, Office of the Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. 
CT. (Feb. 9, 2006). 
144  Situation in the Republic of Korea, Office of the Prosecutor, Article 5 
Report, INT’L CRIM. CT. (June 2014). 
145   Situation in Palestine, Office of the Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. CT. (April 
2012). 
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In domestic criminal systems, there does not exist any 
analogous referral processes, and certainly there is no 
investigation of political conflicts between State and non-State 
actors in order to determine whether a crime within a court’s 
jurisdiction has taken place. The ICC’s Funnel Approach is also 
distinct from other international courts and tribunals. The ad 
hoc tribunals did not have a referral system and the temporal 
and territorial jurisdiction of every case remained the same 
irrespective of the accused. The International Court of Justice 
does not have a referral system, but rather requires explicit 
consent by both parties as well as a determination that the 
subject matter falls within the ICJ’s jurisdiction.146  
The ICC’s OTP, governed by independence, impartiality, 
and objectivity, begins with a broad canvas that can, and 
normatively should, consider information from inside and 
outside the Court’s temporal or territorial jurisdiction. This 
broad mandate at the earlier parts of the prosecutorial process 
is necessary given the increasingly cross-border nature of 
conflicts. If the Court continues to implement a strict and 
bifurcated approach to its jurisdiction, it would ignore necessary 
information and fail to appreciate a cross-border conflict in its 
entirety. Furthermore, the Court would not utilize the open-
ended ability to collect information at the earlier stages of the 
process (in this analogy, the top wide part of the funnel). The 
Funnel Approach is consistent with the Court’s rules and 
jurisprudence emphasizing relevance and probity, as opposed to 
strict temporal and territorial parameters. As such, the Court’s 
ability to consider Context is placed within the Statute’s 
procedural framework at the early stages of preliminary 
examinations and investigations, and should be used 
accordingly to close the impunity gap.  By doing so, the Court 
will be better placed to eventually prosecute perpetrators who 
are non-State Party nationals and who reside in non-State Party 
territories when those perpetrators carry out attacks that fall 
within the Court’s traditional temporal and territorial 
jurisdiction.   
 
                                               
146  Statutes of the International Court of Justice art. 26, June 26, 1945, 
33 U.N.T.S 933. 
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b. Textual Justification – ‘Gravity’ 
 
While the Funnel Approach and the primacy of 
considering evidence according to its relevance and probity sets 
out the general discretionary framework for the OTP and the 
Court in deciding whether to prosecute a case, there exists 
specific open-ended text within the Statute itself that allows for 
the Prosecutor to consider Context when asserting jurisdiction. 
The most relevant example to the herein discussion is the 
gravity threshold. The term ‘gravity’ is contained in Articles 53 
(as a criterion to commence a formal investigation), 17 (relating 
to the admissibility of a situation that is not being prosecuted at 
the national level), 59 (arrest by a custodial state), 77 
(penalties), 78 (sentencing), 84 (revision of sentence), and 90 
(competing requests for extradition). For our purposes, Articles 
17 and 53 are most important, and they state:  
 
Article 17: Issues of Admissibility 
 
1. Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and 
article 1, the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible 
where:  
 (d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further 
action by the Court. 
 
Article 53: Initiation of an investigation 
 
1. The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information 
made available to him or her, initiate an investigation unless 
he or she determines that there is no reasonable basis to 
proceed under this Statute. In deciding whether to initiate an 
investigation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether: 
(b) The case is or would be admissible under article 17; and 
(c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the 
interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial 
reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the 
interests of justice. 
 
If the Prosecutor determines that there is no reasonable basis 
to proceed and his or her determination is based solely on 
subparagraph (c) above, he or she shall inform the Pre-Trial 
Chamber. 
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2. If, upon investigation, the Prosecutor concludes that there 
is not a sufficient basis for a prosecution because: 
(b) The case is inadmissible under article 17; or 
(c) A prosecution is not in the interests of justice, taking into 
account all the circumstances, including the gravity of the 
crime, the interests of victims and the age or infirmity of the 
alleged perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime; 
the Prosecutor shall inform the Pre-Trial Chamber and the 
State making a referral under article 14 or the Security 
Council in a case under article 13, paragraph (b), of his or her 
conclusion and the reasons for the conclusion.147 
 
Margaret deGuzman’s work has concluded, among other 
things, that the concept of gravity is inherently ambiguous and 
this ambiguity has enabled it to serve a constructive role in the 
ICC regime. In her assessment, gravity’s ambiguity has enabled 
the Court to bridge the divide between States that wanted the 
ICC to have a broad mandate and States concerned about the 
Court’s potential for infringing on State sovereignty. According 
to deGuzman, States could therefore agree that the Court’s 
mandate is to prosecute the most serious crimes of international 
concern without agreeing what that would include.148 I argue 
that this inherent ambiguity assists the OTP in collecting 
information both inside and outside the Court’s territorial and 
temporal jurisdiction in order to reach the gravity threshold. 
Neither the Court’s Statute nor any of its supporting documents 
place limitations on what basis, and in accordance with what 
information, the OTP is to determine whether a matter reaches 
the gravity threshold to commence an investigation.  
                                               
147  Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 17, 53. 
148  Margaret M. deGuzman, Gravity Rhetoric: The Good, the Bad, and the 
‘Political’, 107 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 421, 421-22 (2013); see also Margaret M. 
deGuzman, The International Criminal Court’s Gravity Jurisprudence at Ten, 
12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 421, 475 (2013); Margaret M. deGuzman, 
How Serious are International Crimes? The Gravity Problem in International 
Criminal Law, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 18 (2012); Choosing to Prosecute: 
Expressive Selection at the International Criminal Court, supra note 28; 
Margaret M. deGuzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International 
Criminal Court, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1400 (2009). 
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The OTP’s Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations 
sets out that the gravity assessment includes both qualitative 
and quantitative factors even though the OTP, as discussed 
above, has prioritized the number of victims when determining 
whether or not to open an investigation. According to the Policy 
Paper, factors in the gravity determination include the scale of 
crimes, nature of crimes, and manner of crimes’ commission and 
their impact.149 Scale means more than just numbers. Scale can 
include an analysis of the temporal or geographical spread. The 
gravity of crimes with greater quantitative intensity over a short 
period of time is higher than crimes with less quantitative 
intensity over a long period of time.150  
As for the nature of the crimes, the OTP has prioritized 
killing, rape, and child conscription.151 The manner of crimes 
refers to the means employed to execute the crime, the degree of 
participation, the intent of the perpetrator, and the extent to 
which the crimes were systematic or resulted from a plan or 
organised policy or, otherwise, resulted from the abuse of power 
or official capacity. The OTP has placed particular emphasis on 
cruelty, crimes against defenceless victims, crimes involving 
discrimination, and abuse of de jure or de facto power violating 
the responsibility to protect principle.152 The scale of crimes 
refers to the particular suffering placed upon victims, their 
increased vulnerability, subsequent terror instilled, or the 
social, economic, and environmental damage inflicted on 
affected communities.153 As the Statute is silent as to how the 
OTP should determine gravity,154 the Policy Paper remains the 
most concrete explanation of the gravity threshold.  
The OTP does not place any fixed weight on any of the 
above criteria in assessing gravity, but determines gravity based 
on the facts and circumstances of each situation.155 In assessing 
                                               
149  Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 13, ¶ 61. 
150  Id. ¶ 62. 
151  Id. ¶ 63. 
152  Id. ¶ 64. 
153  Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 13, ¶ 65. 
154  See KEVIN JON HELLER, SITUATIONAL GRAVITY UNDER THE ROME 
STATUTE IN FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 33 (2009). 
155  Fabricio Guariglia, The Office of the Prosecutor and the Selection of 
Situations and Cases, in THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
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the above criteria of scale, nature, manner, and impact, it 
becomes clear that the factors in assessing gravity are open-
ended in nature and not necessarily required to be constricted 
by the strict territorial and temporal limits listed in the Statute. 
As such, the OTP would be at liberty to consider Context within 
a given situation when conducting a preliminary examination. 
Also, given the advocacy nature of the Prosecutor’s role, the OTP 
can permissibly err on the side of expansive evidence gathering 
to conclude the gravity threshold is met in initiating an 
investigation.156 
A practical example of when Context consideration can 
result in the OTP reaching the gravity threshold when it may 
not reach that threshold otherwise is when a referral is made by 
a State Party or the UNSC in a scenario where there were 
potential crimes committed both before and after the referral. 
While the UNSC referral for the Situation in Sudan expanded 
its temporal scope back to July 1, 2002,157 the referral for the 
Situation in Libya, as stated above, limited the temporal scope 
only back to February 15, 2011.158 Therefore, this limited the 
OTP to investigating crimes within that time span.  
A scenario can arise where UNSC members, fearing 
prosecution of their own nationals, will come to a compromise to 
limit the permissible timespan under which the OTP can 
investigate. In this regard, there may be casualties on both sides 
of the temporal scope of the referral, whereby the scale, nature, 
manner, and impact may not suffice if limited to the referral’s 
temporal mandate. Relevant and probative information may 
straddle both sides of the Court’s jurisdiction where some 
information falls within its jurisdiction and other information 
does not. For instance, there may have been intense spurts of 
                                               
CRIMINAL COURT 360 (2015). 
156  See Alexander Greenawalt, Justice Without Politics?: Prosecutorial 
Discretion and the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
583 (2007) (arguing that the Prosecutor’s role is inherently political). 
157   S.C. Res. 1593, ¶1 (Mar. 31, 2005) (“Acting under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations, 1. Decides to refer the situation in Darfur since 
1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. . .”). 
158  Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar 
Mohammed Abu Minyar GADDAFI, Saif Al-Islam GADDAFI and Abdullah 
ALSENUSSI, supra note 83. 
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bombing with numerous casualties before the commencement of 
the referral’s temporal scope but substantially less casualties 
within the temporal scope. As in the (initial) Iraq and Palestine 
referrals, this may lead the OTP to conclude that the required 
gravity threshold has not been satisfied, thereby not 
commencing an investigation. On the other hand, in accordance 
with the Funnel Approach and accounting for the standards of 
relevance and probity, the OTP may take an expansive approach 
to temporal jurisdiction in its gravity analysis. Therefore, 
combining the number of casualties both before and within the 
referral’s temporal scope may fulfill the gravity threshold 
resulting in an investigation. All of this is keeping in mind the 
two caveats presented above that the information must be for 
the same conflict and would not reach the gravity threshold 
otherwise. Lastly, one of the four bases for jurisdiction must be 
fulfilled before gravity’s ambiguity can assist in applying a 
contextual approach.  
 
VIII. Implications of Context Consideration 
 
a. Filling the Impunity Gap 
 
Two of the policy objectives stated by the OTP in its 
Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations are: i) ending 
impunity through positive complementarity; and ii) prevention. 
The former reiterates the Court’s exceptional character that 
asserts jurisdiction when national courts are unwilling or unable 
to investigate and/or prosecute a matter.159 Complementarity 
serves to close the impunity gap where those matters not 
pursued on a national level are referred to the ICC. Similarly, 
the prevention objective requires the OTP to “systematically and 
proactively collect open source information on alleged crimes 
that [ ] appear to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court.”160 
Both of these objectives, whether to step in as a complementary 
Court to national jurisdictions or work with national 
jurisdictions to prevent crimes before they occur, in fact, support 
                                               
159  Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 13, ¶¶ 100-03. 
160  Id. ¶ 104. 
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an expansive approach to information collection by the OTP, 
whether it ultimately asserts jurisdiction or not.  
I have alluded throughout this paper to the need for the 
ICC to assert jurisdiction expansively as doing so would fill the 
impunity gap. I use this term to mean two distinct but, 
nonetheless, related concepts. The first recognizes that the ICC 
is a complimentary Court of last resort and its jurisdiction only 
takes hold once a national court is unwilling or unable to 
prosecute a matter. If a State Party does not proceed to 
investigate an attack or incident and, subsequently, the ICC 
finds that that matter falls outside its jurisdiction or is otherwise 
inadmissible based on insufficient gravity or interests of justice 
grounds, a jurisdictional vacuum would be created outside the 
prosecutorial will of State Parties and the ICC.  
The second manifestation of the impunity gap concerns 
non-State Parties that, out of prosecutorial discretion or political 
sensitivities, decide not to investigate a matter. This has been 
the case with various soldiers or defence contractors that the 
U.S. has not prosecuted as a result of alleged crimes committed 
while in Iraq.161 Whereas in the first concept the impunity gap 
is created by the ICC’s unwillingness to launch an investigation 
based on jurisdictional or admissibility grounds, this second type 
of impunity gap arises due to the ICC’s legal constriction in 
venturing into the jurisdiction of a non-State Party absent an 
Article 12(3) Declaration or UNSC referral. 
While the second type of impunity gap cannot be 
remedied even with expansive notions of jurisdiction, under 
Context, the OTP, and subsequently the Pre-Trial Chamber, can 
remedy the first type of impunity gap by considering Context 
when the gravity threshold under strict textual notions of 
jurisdiction would not be met. In this regard, Context is a tool for 
jurisdictional expansiveness that assists the Court in its 
admissibility analyses by bolstering the information available to 
meet the gravity threshold.  
                                               
161  See, e.g., Lara Jakes & Rebecca Santana, Iraq Prime Minister: 
Immunity Issue Scuttled U.S. Troop Deal, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2011), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/oct/22/iraq-pm-immunity-issue-
scuttled-us-troop-deal/. 
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An expansive approach is not only in line with the ICC’s 
procedural framework under the Funnel Approach and its 
textual permissibility, but also accords with the Statute’s 
underlying principles of prosecuting the most serious crimes of 
international concern.162 Akhavan argues that prosecuting a 
select number of mid to high level officials in international 
criminal tribunals, in fact, serves as a general deterrent to 
future atrocities. He states, “it is not necessary . . .  to punish a 
large number of perpetrators in order to achieve deterrence . . . 
[t]he punishment of particular individuals—whether star 
villains such as Karadzić or Mladić or ordinary perpetrators 
such as Tadić and Erdemović—becomes an instrument through 
which respect for the rule of law is instilled into the popular 
consciousness.”163According to Akhavan, prosecutions can 
contribute to replacing a culture of impunity with a culture of 
compliance.164  
While it may be speculative to conclude that increased 
international prosecutions will result in fewer future 
atrocities—and the reality has not provided any such 
suggestion—expanding the ICC’s jurisdiction by applying 
Context will narrow the current space occupied by many 
perpetrators who have carried out attacks on State Party 
territories. These perpetrators have essentially escaped 
prosecution whether or not they are State Party nationals. Their 
impunity stems from the inability or unwillingness of their own 
State to prosecute them and the ICC’s reluctance to commence 
an investigation.165  
                                               
162  Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 1. 
163  Payam Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former 
Yugoslavia?, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 737, 747, 749 (1999). 
164  David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of 
International Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 487, 486 (1999). Wippman 
questions this assertion by Akhavan in that a transformation from a culture of 
impunity to compliance would require far more than the occasional 
punishment of a particular offender since i) the signaling effects are not clear; 
and ii) the internationalization of norms is not sufficient to prevent atrocities. 
165  A contentious but relevant example of the first type of impunity gap 
mentioned herein is the proposed prosecution of former British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair who engaged his armed forces in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. See 
Twiggy Garcia, Tony Blair Should Be Prosecuted for War Crimes—Not Just 
Judged by History, INDEPENDENT (May 7, 2014), http://www.the guardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2014/may/07/tony-blair-war-crimes-prosecuted-eel-like-boris-
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IX. Example: Prosecuting ISIS at the ICC 
 
Potential prosecution against the Islamic State in Iraq 
and Syria (“ISIS”) presents a tangible example as to how Context 
consideration can alter the Court’s assertion of jurisdiction. The 
argument presented below to prosecute ISIS would be analogous 
to Comoros’s argument that the flotilla attack should be 
considered in conjunction with attacks in the Gaza Strip, which 
were outside the Court’s territorial jurisdiction. As a starting 
point, we consider the ISIS attacks in Paris on November 13, 
2015166 and in Brussels on March 22, 2016.167 France has been 
an ICC State Party since July 18, 1998168 and Belgium since 
September 10, 1998.169 The Prosecutor has taken the position 
that she cannot investigate ISIS attacks in Iraq and Syria, as its 
leadership consists of Iraqi and Syrian nationals who are not 
subject to the Court’s nationality jurisdiction.170 This is in spite 
of the fact that nationals from State Parties have traveled to Iraq 
and Syria, and have carried out attacks that can reasonably be 
considered within the Court’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the 
Prosecutor has taken the position that she cannot investigate 
ISIS, as it falls beyond the Court’s nationality and territorial 
jurisdiction.  
As outlined in Part II, to prosecute ISIS leadership, non-
State Party nationals who perpetrate attacks on both State and 
non-State Party territories, the following criteria would have to 
be fulfilled to proceed with an investigation under Context: 
                                               
johnson. 
166  Paris Attacks: What Happened on the Night, BBC NEWS (Dec. 9, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34818994. 
167  Lizzie Deardon, Isis Supporters Claim Group Responsible for Brussels 
Attacks: ‘We Have Come to You with Slaughter’, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 22, 2016), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/isis-supporters-claim-
responsibility-for-brussels-attacks-bombings-belgium-airport-maalbeek-
metro-we-a6945886.html. 
168  State Parties to the Rome Statute: Western Europe and other States, 
INT’L CRIM. CT., https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/ 
the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2017). 
169  Id. 
170  ISIS Statement, supra note 19. 
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1. ISIS attacks—whether directly by its leadership or (more 
likely) through its subordinates—occur on State and non-
State Party territories;  
2. ISIS leadership resides in non-State Party territories and 
members are nationals of a non-State Party(ies);  
3. Attacks on State Party territories, taken in isolation, would 
not reach the gravity threshold; 
4. Aggregating the casualties and/or effects of ISIS attacks on 
State and non-State Party territories would fulfill the 
gravity threshold;  
5. The State Party on the territory of which at least one ISIS 
attack took place is unable or unwilling to prosecute the 
perpetrators.  
 
Taking as granted that the perpetrators of the Paris and 
Brussels attacks are ISIS agents under the command and 
control of ISIS leadership in Iraq and/or Syria, attacks by ISIS, 
whether in France or Belgium or, otherwise, in Iraq or Syria,171 
fall within the context of the same conflict. Nonetheless, only a 
portion of the attacks took place within the Court’s territorial 
jurisdiction.  
Accounting for Context as framed herein, the OTP, 
whether on its own accord or through the UN or a State Party, 
can begin to collect information in relation to any of the attacks 
listed above, whether or not committed on the territory of a State 
Party. Comoros similarly argued that information relating to 
attacks on both the flotilla and within the Gaza Strip as a result 
of Operation Cast Lead can be collected. To prosecute ISIS, 
temporal jurisdiction will not be an issue as both France and 
Belgium signed the Statute well before the attacks on their 
respective territories took place. However, territorial 
jurisdiction may factor into whether the OTP ultimately decides 
to commence an investigation and pursue prosecution against 
ISIS leadership. Under traditional territorial jurisdiction, the 
                                               
171  Atrocities in Iraq and Syria perpetrated by ISIS have been oft-
documented. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, Annual Report, POL Index 10/2552/2016 
(2016); The Persistence of History, ECONOMIST (Aug. 22, 2015), http://www. 
economist.com/news/international/21661812-islamic-states-revival-slavery-
extreme-though-it-finds-disquieting-echoes-across; Human Rights Watch: Iraq 
Report, https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/n-africa/iraq. 
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OTP, as it has already deemed in its April 8, 2015 Statement, 
cannot pursue ISIS leadership in Iraq and Syria. Under the four-
phase process outlined in the OTP’s Policy Paper, evidence of 
ISIS’s operations in Iraq and Syria would be discarded at either 
Phase 1 or Phase 2, which are before the OTP can even consider 
whether the attack meets the gravity requirement under the 
Statute.  
Limiting its preliminary examination to isolated attacks 
in France and Belgium while ignoring the background of ISIS’s 
operations and ongoing atrocities in Iraq and Syria, which have 
included civilian executions, kidnappings, authorized rapes, and 
the destruction of cultural property, would make it difficult for 
the OTP to decide that ISIS’s attacks meet the requisite gravity 
requirements to launch an investigation. This is especially true 
given the relatively limited number of casualties as a result of 
the Paris and Brussels attacks in comparison to other attacks 
where the Court has determined sufficient quantitative gravity 
for an investigation.172  
Bifurcating information relating to ISIS’s attacks 
between State Party and non-State Party territories would 
obscure the sheer quantity of lives ISIS attacks have claimed. 
The number of casualties has played a salient role in the 
Prosecutor’s past decisions whether to initiate an investigation. 
In his address to the Assembly of State Parties in November 
2005, the Court’s first Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, stated, 
“[i]n Uganda, we examined information concerning all groups 
that had committed crimes in the region. . . . Between July 2002 
and June 2004, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) was allegedly 
responsible for at least 2200 killings and 3200 abductions in over 
850 attacks. It was clear that we must start with the LRA.”173 
Conversely, in his decision to initially not proceed with an 
                                               
172  The Paris attack resulted in 130 casualties and the Brussels attack 
resulted in 32 casualties. See Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra 
note 13; see also Brussels Attacks Death Toll Lowered to 32, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/brussels-attacks-death-
toll-lowered_us_56facaa4e4b0a372181b27ed. 
173  Statement to the Fourth Session of the Assembly of State Parties by 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Office of the Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. CT. Nov. 28, 2005, 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ProsecutorMorenoOcampo_Opening_28Nov
05.pdf. 
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investigation into potential war crimes committed by British 
officials in Iraq, Moreno-Ocampo stated, “[t]he information 
available at this time supports a reasonable basis for an 
estimated 4 to 12 victims of wilful killing and a limited number 
of victims of inhuman treatment, totaling in all less than 20 
persons.”174  
Despite criticism of the overly quantitative approach to 
investigative selection, the OTP’s continuing policy appears to 
be one that prioritizes situations with a larger number of 
victims. As such, if quantity determines whether the OTP will 
investigate a situation, a myopic bifurcated approach to 
jurisdiction under the strict wording of the Statute ignores the 
trans-territorial nature of modern conflicts where national 
boundaries are being blurred and organizational policies may 
exist across such boundaries. This reality is exemplified in ISIS’s 
attacks in various States and non-State Party territories. 
Considering Context when deciding whether to commence an 
investigation into a situation is not only permissible but also 
provides a better assessment of the true nature of a trans-border 
conflict and whether it is a situation in which crimes under the 
Court’s jurisdiction have taken place. Also, this expansive 
approach would fall within the Court’s previous jurisprudence, 
which prioritized relevance and probity of information when 
determining whether to commence an investigation.  
To conclude the ISIS example, traditional jurisdictional 
parameters, as they currently stand, leave open an impunity gap 
where potential perpetrators or criminal organizations that may 
come within the Court’s jurisdiction are sheltered from 
prosecution because the majority of their acts are committed 
                                               
174  Letters to Senders re Iraq, Office of the Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. CT. 
(Feb. 9, 2006), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/FD042F2E-678E-4EC6-
8121-690BE61D0B5A/143682/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February 
_2007.pdf. Kevin Jon Heller has argued, conversely, for ‘situational gravity’ 
where the OTP, rather than exclusively relying on numbers of casualties as in 
the LRA and the Iraq examples above, should take a qualitative approach 
focusing on the systematicity of crimes, their social alarm, and the level of 
State involvement. He argues that “[i]nvestigating situations that involve 
systematic and socially alarming crime but fewer victims would significantly 
increase the likelihood that potential prosecutors would be apprehended and 
prosecuted, thus increasing the deterrent value of those investigations.” See 
HELLER, supra note 154. 
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outside the Court’s strict territorial boundaries. If, for instance, 
France and/or Belgium are unable or unwilling to investigate the 
attacks as contemplated in Article 17 of the Statute, not only will 
a decision by the Prosecutor to not investigate inhibit the Court 
from prosecuting crimes in those States, but it will also 
immunize criminal acts that have taken place by ISIS leadership 
and functionaries within Iraq and Syria. The same argument 
was applied by Comoros when arguing that not commencing an 
investigation will immunize the flotilla attack and attacks in the 
Gaza Strip. For ISIS, if the same organization is responsible for 
criminal acts within France, Belgium, Iraq, and Syria, a full 
contextual analysis aggregating information from attacks in all 
those countries to meet the requisite gravity threshold will have 
the potential for exacting punishment on ISIS’s leadership for 
crimes within State and non-State Parties alike.  
 
X. Criticisms of Expansive Jurisdiction 
 
The crux of my argument herein lies in the assumption 
that the ICC should be a strong and robust Court with expansive 
jurisdiction so as to close the impunity gap. Iontcheva, 
conversely, has argued that a weaker Court that relies more on 
national governments with more diverse perspectives and 
greater acceptability by local populations is a better way to 
achieve the goals of international criminal justice.175 She has 
proposed four models of how to implement international 
criminal law in the absence of a strong ICC: i) having the UN 
create more ad hoc tribunals, such as the ICTY or ICTR; ii) 
increasing the number of national prosecutions either under 
international law or domestic human rights and war crimes 
statutes; iii) asserting universal jurisdiction in domestic courts; 
or iv) establishing mixed courts comprised of international and 
national judges.176 Furthermore, her critiques of a strong, 
centralized ICC include its lack of informed and diverse 
perspectives, its inability to foster the internalization of 
                                               
175  Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law: 
The International Criminal Court as a Roving Mixed Court, 52 STAN. J. INT’L 
L. 52 (2004). 
176  Id. at 16-18. 
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international norms leading to a backlash by local communities, 
and its inability to promote post-conflict reconciliation as a 
result of being far from the place where the crimes occurred.177  
Needless to say, I disagree with any current proposal to 
weaken the ICC’s jurisdiction in exchange for stronger domestic 
courts or mixed courts, especially in light of the Court’s nascent 
nature and increased membership since its inception. An 
increasingly globalised world marked by greater instances of 
cross-border conflicts between both rebel and State forces—
whether on the ground, in the air, through the water, or in 
cyberspace—is precisely the reason why a strong and centralized 
ICC with eventual universal membership will be more effective 
at prosecuting current crimes and deterring future ones than a 
weak and decentralized Court. I now tackle some likely 
criticisms that may arise to the ICC’s proposed implementation 
of Context.  
 
a. Obviating State Sovereignty 
 
The first potential criticism of the above expansive 
approach is that investigating potential crimes within non-State 
Parties that have not consented to the Court’s jurisdiction 
infringes on territorial sovereignty. Critics of an expansive 
approach to ICC jurisdiction will note that the ICC is a treaty-
based Court that requires a State to sign onto the Statute for its 
jurisdiction to apply. Benzing characterized the primary 
rationale for the ICC’s complementary jurisdictional framework 
to be state sovereignty.178 While this criticism is valid and in line 
with traditional conceptions of jurisdiction outlined in the 
Court’s documents, there are other aspects of the Statute where 
state sovereignty is compromised without a State’s consent. Two 
specific instances of this are UNSC referrals and Article 12(3) 
Declarations. Both of these mechanisms used to assert 
jurisdiction can relate to non-State Parties, and in the case of 
                                               
177  See id. at 20-21. 
178  See Benzing, supra note 46, at 595 (“The most apparent underlying 
interest that the complementarity regime of the Court is designed to protect 
and serve is the sovereignty [,] both of State parties and third states.”); see also 
Rep. of the Preparatory Comm. on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Ct., 
GAOR 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22 (Doc. A/51/22), ¶ 155. 
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Article 12(3) Declarations can swell the Court’s temporal 
jurisdiction back to July 1, 2002.179 Furthermore, state 
sovereignty is relegated in the general complimentary approach 
to the ICC, in that the Court will step into the place of a national 
jurisdiction if the latter is unwilling or unable to prosecute an 
act in which there is a reasonable basis to believe it falls within 
the Court’s jurisdiction. State sovereignty, even within the 
traditional notions of jurisdiction, is not an absolute bar for the 
ICC to extend its long arm into the domestic sphere.  
There is, indeed, a political connotation to the Court 
extending into territories that have not consented to the Court’s 
jurisdiction. Powerful nations, such as the U.S. and China, that 
have not signed on to the Statute will likely never have the Court 
reach into its jurisdiction to prosecute individuals that they are 
neither willing nor able to prosecute themselves. However, the 
more likely scenario (if a contextual approach as argued here is 
adopted) is that the Court may seek to extend its territorial 
reach into those non-State Parties that do not exert as much 
political influence, such as Iraq and Syria in the ISIS example 
above. This may lead to selective prosecution, an already well-
established criticism of a Court that has disproportionately 
targeted prosecutions in African nations.180  
The rebuttal to the selective prosecution criticism if 
Context is accepted is that the prospect of selective prosecution 
exists whether or not Context is adopted. The contention that the 
ICC has adopted an Afro-centric approach to its prosecutorial 
ambit has existed within its current jurisdictional confines 
without a contextual approach. With an independent Prosecutor 
armed with discretionary powers in addition to multiple avenues 
of referral, one of which can be subject to veto by the UNSC, the 
prospect of selective prosecution will always exist. However, as 
argued here, the Court’s mandate is to close the impunity gap 
and ensure those situations involving crimes at a mass scale 
falling within its jurisdiction are brought before it. Only then 
                                               
179  Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 12(3), 13(b). 
180  See, e.g., Geoffrey York, Kenya and South Africa Shelve Protests 
Against International Criminal Court, GLOBE AND MAIL (Nov. 26, 2015), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/kenya-and-south-africa-shelve-
protests-against-international-criminal-court/article27503348/. 
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can the Court unabashedly expand its jurisdiction through 
Context despite the perennial prospect of prosecutorial bias.  
As for the prospect of powerful nations, such as the U.S. 
or China, having their nationals subject to the Court’s 
jurisdiction under Context when they perpetrate attacks on 
State Party territories, this contention is easy to rebut legally 
but difficult at a political level. Legally, the ICC should assert 
its jurisdiction objectively irrespective of a particular nation’s 
political clout. While the U.S. may be able to hinder the Court’s 
effectiveness if its nationals are investigated, this does not 
change the legal permissibility under the Statute to apply 
Context to cross-border conflicts. Admittedly, as a political 
matter, it may be more prudent to attempt prosecuting ISIS 
leadership, as opposed to Dick Cheney or Donald Rumsfeld, as 
the U.S. could exert its political will on the ICC or, more likely, 
its allies who are State Parties if either of those individuals are 
considered for prosecution. Nonetheless, the political 
ramifications of applying Context are beyond the confines of this 
paper. I merely assert that there are legal justifications and 
court precedents allowing for an expansive approach to temporal 
and territorial jurisdiction.  
 
b. Legalism vs. Activism 
 
Judge Hersch Lauterpact of the International Court of 
Justice wrote in 1961 that there are two possible judicial 
approaches in either international or domestic law. The first 
approach conceives a judge’s task to be primarily, if not solely, 
confined to deciding the case at issue. The other approach 
conceives it properly within a judge’s purview, in addition to 
deciding the present case, “to utilise those aspects of it which 
have a wider interest or connotation, in order to make general 
pronouncements of law and principle that may enrich and 
develop the law.”181 Commenting on this distinction, the ICJ’s 
Judge Gerald Fitzmaurice exclaimed that while domestic courts 
have national legislatures to fill the gaps in the law, there exists 
no equivalent in international law. He wrote, “[t]he 
                                               
181  G. Fitzmaurice, Hersch Lauterpacht, The Scholar as Judge, 37 B.Y.I.L. 
1, 14 (1961). 
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international community is therefore peculiarly dependent on 
its international tribunals for the development and clarification 
of the law, and for lending to it an authority more substantial 
and less precarious than can be drawn from the often divergent 
or uncertain practices of States.”182  
Judges Lauterpact and Fitzmaurice’s comments could 
rightfully be construed as arguing for the construction of a 
coherent set of judicial decisions premised on precedent in order 
to establish a coherent policy framework under which 
international courts make decisions. However, more broadly, the 
Judges’ comments also regard the scope of an international 
judge’s decision-making powers and their ability to consider 
wider context when rendering judgments. This is especially true 
in Justice Lauterpact’s reference to the “wider interest and 
connotation” that a judge can consider even though his or her 
decision will pertain to the facts of a particular case. Those 
writing after World War II, when the advent of international 
courts took root, were aware of the nascence of international law 
and the necessity to develop robust judgments capable of 
precedential value. 
A growing concern in international law is judicial 
scope.183 For the purpose of this paper, while it may be within 
the confines of the OTP’s responsibilities to consider Context 
under its rubric of impartiality, independence, and objectivity 
when considering whether to commence an investigation, a 
justifiable criticism arises whether, and to what extent, judges 
of the Court can step outside the jurisdictional boundaries of the 
Statute in rendering a situation admissible before the Court, 
                                               
182  Friedmann, supra note 1, at 143-44. “Of interest, after Friedmann 
expounds on the efficacy of IMT, he notes that the unlikeliness of establishing 
a permanent international criminal court “in an inevitably highly charged 
atmosphere of retribution of the victors against the vanquished. . . . nor is such 
a development at all likely in the foreseeable future. A draft Convention 
establishing an International Criminal Court has no prospect of adoption.” See 
id. at 145-46. 
183  While there is scarce literature on judicial scope in international 
criminal law, more has been written in the field of investor-state arbitration in 
relation to the difference between arbitrators and judges. See, e.g., W. Michael 
Reisman, Case Specific Mandates versus Systemic Implications: How Should 
Investment Tribunals Decide?: The Freshfields Arbitration Lecture, 29 ARB. 
INT’L 131 (2013). 
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and/or subsequently utilizing contextual evidence to issue an 
arrest warrant or convict an accused. While I concur with the 
decisions from the ad hoc tribunals, the court emphasized that 
the requisite elements of crimes must come within the Statute’s 
strict territorial and temporal limitations to find an accused 
guilty. However, the threshold enquiry of whether to commence 
or authorize an investigation can account for Context according 
to the herein doctrinal arguments.  
The collective goal of the ICC and all States—whether or 
not as members of the Court—should be to completely fill the 
impunity gap such that all cases in which a domestic jurisdiction 
is unwilling or unable to prosecute a matter where a reasonable 
basis to believe crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction have taken 
place should be considered for ICC investigation. Relevant 
contextual considerations can assist the OTP and Pre-Trial 
Chamber to determine whether to proceed with such 
investigations. Asking Pre-Trial Chamber judges to consider 
Context does not prejudice an individual’s rights because i) at 
the authorization stage there is no accused; and ii) at the arrest 
warrant stage, even if there is a dispute as to whether the 
alleged crimes meet the gravity threshold, there would still be 
evidence that crimes within the Court’s strict jurisdiction have 
occurred. Judges would not be politicized by considering Context 
as it is not they who are choosing what situations to investigate. 
Rather, if a matter is not referred by a State Party or UNSC, it 
would be at the discretion of an independent Prosecutor who is 
not precluded from prioritizing some situations over others. 
Also, Context considerations would apply universally to all 
potential situations irrespective of what region of the world the 
conflict occurs. 
 
c. Ambiguity vs. Certainty 
 
Another potential criticism to the herein argument of 
expanding the ICC’s traditional notions of jurisdiction to 
consider Context is that by doing so the legal framework under 
which the OTP and Pre-Trial Chamber function will incorporate 
an inordinate amount of uncertainty whereby there will no 
longer be consistent criteria in jurisdiction and admissibility 
analyses. This argument has some teeth, especially since part of 
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a court’s processes and decisions are designed to establish 
precedent to guide future decisions. Nonetheless, I am proposing 
that the OTP and Pre-Trial Chamber, in all situations 
(irrespective of their referral mechanism) should consider 
Context. By employing Context consistently for all potential 
situations, the OTP and Pre-Trial Chamber would be 
recognizing the changing face of modern armed conflict that is 
constrained by neither place nor time. The crimes within the 
Court’s jurisdiction universally require some form of 
organizational and policy-based conduct on the part of a 
government or rebel apparatus, and at times such conduct 
cannot be fully assessed without applying Context.  
Proponents of legal certainty will inevitably tout that the 
drafters’ intent when formulating the Statute was to not assert 
jurisdiction over those States not party to the Court, except for 
UNSC referrals and Article 12(3) Declarations. This position 
advocates both for state sovereignty and the necessity for legal 
certainty when drawing the Court’s jurisdictional boundaries. 
While there is little doubt the drafters intended to limit 
jurisdiction to the explicit parameters set out in the Statute, 
they included open-ended terminology, such as ‘gravity,’ 
permitting the Court to expand its jurisdiction to adequately fill 
the impunity gap. Both the Funnel Approach and gravity’s 
inherent ambiguity allow for the OTP and Pre-Trial Chamber to 
apply Context despite its lack of jurisdictional certainty.  
 
XI. Conclusion 
 
On March 14, 2016, the United States Congress voted 
unanimously that the atrocities committed by ISIS committed in 
Iraq and Syria constitute genocide.184 Congress had adopted a 
similar vote in 2004 with regard to acts in Darfur.185 After the 
March 14 vote, Cameron Hudson, director of the Holocaust 
Museum’s Centre for the Prevention of Genocide, stated, “one 
                                               
184  See Michelle Boorstein, The U.S. House Just Voted Unanimously that 
the Islamic State Commits ‘genocide.’ Now What?, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2016/03/15/the-u-s-
house-just-voted-unanimously-that-the-islamic-state-commits-genocide-now-
what. 
185  Id. 
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thing that has troubled me is that I know of no organized 
government effort to investigate crimes committed.”186 Mr. 
Hudson’s comment is not ill-placed.  
The current legal framework concerning criminal acts 
being committed by ISIS in Iraq and Syria are immunized from 
prosecution. Any UNSC referral to the ICC would likely be 
vetoed by Russia or even China; neither Iraq nor Syria have 
signed onto the Statute for a State Party referral to be 
legitimate. It is such an instance where the implementation of 
Context by the ICC’s OTP and the Pre-Trial Chamber can play a 
role in prosecuting ISIS crimes. The terrorist organization has 
claimed responsibility for attacks in State Parties, including 
France187 and Belgium,188 as well as in Turkey, a non-State 
Party.189 *Aggregating the relevant and probative evidence from 
all these attacks, plus those in Iraq and Syria, would inevitably 
meet the gravity threshold. Context considerations would also 
interpret the attacks—either inside or outside the Court’s 
territorial jurisdiction—as being perpetrated by one criminal 
enterprise with its leadership in Iraq and Syria and agents in 
parts of Europe where attacks have taken place. Given France 
and Belgium’s ratification of the Statute, the possibility 
therefore exists to prosecute ISIS leadership for attacks both 
inside and outside State Party territories. A similar approach 
could be taken toward other organizations whose attacks 
permeate state boundaries and occur over a prolonged period of 
time. Although this innovative argument was presented by 
Comoros, it was not settled by the Pre-Trial Chamber and thus 
remains an open enquiry.  
                                               
186  Id. 
187  See Vivienne Walt, ISIS Claims Responsibility for Paris Attacks as 
Arrests are Made, TIME (Nov. 14, 2015), http://time.com/4112884/paris-attacks-
isis-isil-france-francois-hollande/. 
188  See Alissa J. Ruben et al., Strikes Claimed by ISIS Shut Brussels and 
Shake European Security, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2016), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2016/03/23/world/europe/brussels-airport-explosions.html. 
189  See Lizzie Deardon, Ankara Terror Attack ‘Ordered by ISIS to Cause 
Political Instability and Delay Elections’, Turkish Prosecutors Say, THE 
INDEPENDENT (Nov. 28, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ 
europe/ankara-terror-attack-ordered-by-isis-to-cause-political-instability-and-
delay-elections-turkish-a6711766.html. 
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I have argued here that the changing structure of modern 
conflicts paired with the existence of a permanent Court with 
expansive procedural mechanisms and open-ended admissibility 
factors are ripe considerations to close the impunity gap. This 
will serve to fulfill the Court’s mandate of prosecuting the most 
serious crimes of international concern. While a unanimous vote 
in Congress has little, if any, legal effect in its ability to render 
punishment upon perpetrators of genocide or crimes against 
humanity or war crimes, the ICC harbors the ability to enforce 
its law upon international criminal actors.  
In taking an expansive jurisdictional approach, I do not 
contend that the Court, whether its judges or the OTP, should 
overstep its judiciary bounds to become legislators or appease 
powerful nations by pursuing some prosecutions over others. I 
also do not contend that the Court has to change its current 
conception of jurisdiction as laid out in the Statute. I merely 
suggest that the jurisdictional framework necessary to close the 
impunity gap already exists within the Statute, both 
procedurally and textually. Until and when—if ever—the 
Statute receives universal acceptance, an expansive approach to 
jurisdiction will be required to adequately appreciate the nature 
of cross-border and inter-temporal conflicts. Context will be most 
useful when there is an attack on a State Party’s territory by an 
organization operating out of a non-State Party that is on the 
cusp of being of sufficient gravity for the OTP to commence an 
investigation.  
The potential for further criticism in that the Court lacks 
utility because of its inability to prosecute the world’s largest 
conflicts, or is selective in its prosecutions is real. Adopting an 
expansive approach to jurisdiction, rather than a constricted 
one, would aid the Court in fulfilling its complementary 
mandate, and provide legal recourse where none has existed in 
decades—or even centuries—past. The hope is that by applying 
Context the Court will perennially resolve to fulfill its ambitious 
mandate thoroughly in light of the evolving nature of conflicts.  
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